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ABSTRACT
Neal, Jacob Peter. M.A. The University of Memphis. May 2010. Rethinking
Representations of Health and Disease: Foucault, Canguilhem, and the U.S. Center for
Disease Control Reports on AIDS. Major Professor: Mary Beth Mader, Ph.D.
This project explores the representation and conceptualization of health and disease
through the historical analyses of Michel Foucault and Georges Canguilhem. By tracing
the historical emergence and formation of certain concepts of disease and health from the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, their thought provides the groundwork for an
investigation of our contemporary representations of a distinctly modern disease—
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). The first two chapters extract from this
philosophical and historical work the theoretical basis for an analysis of the language and
representation of AIDS. The final chapter then analyzes the U.S. Center for Disease
Control (CDC) publications on AIDS in the late twentieth century in these theoretical
terms. The thesis argues that the contemporary theoretical basis for CDC representations
of AIDS should be understood in terms of their relation to past theories of disease.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of disease is neither concrete nor stable. It emerges within a
particular epoch, structures recognition and knowledge for a time, and then morphs into
something new or disappears entirely. When a new theory of disease comes to
dominance, it alters our subjective experience and awareness of both disease and health.
It even modifies our perception, changing what manifests as disease before the medical
gaze. What was once classified as disease slowly evolves or suddenly vanishes, and novel
configurations and manifestations of disease appear before the gaze. Indeed, the very
landscape of health and disease transforms alongside our theories.
For those committed to the rationalist and realist projects of modern science,
turning around to retrace the history of medical concepts may seem an unnecessary
detour. Shifting our focus from the future before us to the past behind may seem to stall
the progress of modern science and medicine and hinder the development of novel
treatments and therapeutic interventions. If the theoretical advances of science have
nothing to do with the social and political milieu from which they emerge and if the
development of medical and scientific theories necessarily converges with the truth of the
world, then a return to history would be both a superfluous and frivolous enterprise, one
fit for historians and perhaps philosophers, but not for scientists and physicians.
However, if we take seriously the insights of Nietzsche‘s perspectivism, then our world
opens up onto a new range of perspectives and possibilities. We live in an age where our
past informs our present, truth is not to be discovered within the fabric of the world, and
the most productive projects are ones not of discovery but of redescription. In this post-
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Nietzschean world, historicist thinkers destabilize our own systems of thought and
encourage us to consider alternate ways to make sense of our world.
This project is about the configuration of disease and the language of our theories
of disease and health. It is an analysis of some historical concepts of disease deployed by
the sciences of medicine and pathology from the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth
centuries. In this work, I turn my attention to the thought and analyses of two historical
thinkers, Michel Foucault and Georges Canguilhem. These two thinkers develop both
historical and critical analyses of the systems of thought that undergird and maintain the
shifting perspectives and theories of health and disease invoked by medicine in the past
three centuries. By extracting and developing some key concepts from within their works,
I aim to provide the tools to understand and reconsider the language and configuration of
a distinctly modern disease—acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). The current
project discovers within Foucault‘s and Canguilhem‘s critical and descriptive works on
health and disease a set of potential tools to help us make sense of the historical
formation and emergence of the medical theory that underlies the contemporary discourse
surrounding AIDS and the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).
A caveat on method: the current project is largely a historically conceptual, or
genealogical, one. Through consideration of the work of Foucault and Canguilhem, I seek
not to locate transhistorical concepts of disease that must pertain to the contemporary
phenomenon of HIV and AIDS, but, rather, I seek historical concepts in order to both
understand and problematize our current configuration of this disease. That is, I have no a
priori knowledge that the historical concepts that seem to me to hold the most potential
for this project, which I develop in the first two chapters of this work, will have any
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fruitful points of overlap with the contemporary medical and scientific discourses on HIV
and AIDS. I have neither the time nor the space within this work to fully develop all the
connections and draw out all the resemblances and similarities between the historical
concepts presented by Foucault and Canguilhem and the modern medical and scientific
discourse surrounding HIV and AIDS. Despite this methodological lack of assurance, I
believe both points of congruence and divergence between historical theories of disease
and the modern configuration of HIV and AIDS will prove interesting and fruitful.
This work does not address the tremendous body of secondary literature
developed in and around the concept and theories of AIDS and HIV arising in the last
quarter of the twentieth century. Nor does it enter into the methodological debates
surrounding the work of these two historical thinkers, particularly Foucault‘s work with
historical systems of thought. Rather, I focus exclusively on the work of Foucault and
Canguilhem regarding the historical development of medicine and science. By devoting
the majority of my theoretical attention to a close reading of their work, I provide the
foundation for the further development of thought on this contemporary disease from the
perspective of these two thinkers.
For the remainder of this introduction I briefly sketch out the structure of this
work. In Chapter 1, I begin with a focused consideration of some concepts arising from
Canguilhem‘s text The Normal and the Pathological. These include an assessment of
three theories of disease (the ontological, functional, and positivist theories) a
characterization of the point of view adopted by these theories, and a consideration of the
historical development and deployment of the concepts of the biological and
physiological norm by nineteenth-century positivists. In Chapter 2, I turn to the work of
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Foucault. In the first section, through an analysis of The Birth of the Clinic, I recount the
transition and epistemic rupture that reorganized medical knowledge at the close of the
eighteenth century. I then turn to Foucault‘s discussion of the concept of the condition.
For this section, I consider his analysis of the concept of the condition formulated by
forensic psychiatry in the latter half of the nineteenth century in Abnormal, along with
Foucault‘s analysis of two specific conditions: (1) the historical figure of the madman in
History of Madness and (2) the historical emergence of the homosexual in The History of
Sexuality. Then, in the third section, I extract Foucault‘s description of the dangerous
individual from Abnormal.
In the final chapter, Chapter 3, I shift my focus to the medical and scientific
discourse that emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth century surrounding HIV and
AIDS. Since the contemporary literature on these phenomena is virtually boundless, I
restrict my analysis to the discourse arising from the U.S. Center for Disease Control
(CDC). Throughout what has come to be called the AIDS epidemic of the late twentieth
century, the CDC has published the most up-to-date epidemiological and pathological
information about the virus and the disease in its weekly publication, Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR). In the United States, the CDC assimilated and
disseminated the clinical findings of physicians across the country and the results of
cutting-edge research on the virus and the syndrome. This agency also took charge in the
implementation of surveillance and disease prevention programs. In addition to
developing the case definition and the standard practices for HIV and AIDS reporting and
surveillance, the CDC produced the first documents offering guidelines for the treatment
of AIDS and the corresponding opportunistic infections (OI). Because of its critical role
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at the intersection of both public health and therapeutic intervention and its mediating
function between the physician and the research scientist, the CDC in its weekly
publication offers a unique site of analysis. Although other discourses emerged from
other outlets, the CDC‘s MMWR presents a cross-section of the dominant discourses on
HIV and AIDS within both the scientific and medical communities.
Through this examination of historical concepts of health and disease and their
application to our modern conceptions, this project aims to shed new light on the
contemporary phenomena of HIV and AIDS. By unearthing the origins of our
contemporary theories of disease, this work hopes to afford a glimpse of our own
structure of knowledge as one that emerged historically and will one day more than likely
be supplanted by a new structure yet to come. Following Foucault, this work ultimately
aims to demonstrate that the theoretical configuration of HIV and AIDS that emerges
from the CDC discourse at the turn of the last century is ―only one way‖ to conceptualize
disease and ―in all likelihood neither the first, nor the most fundamental.‖ 1

1

Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, trans.
A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage, 1994), 3 (hereafter cited in text as BC).
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CHAPTER 1
CANGUILHEM: THE EXPOSITION OF CERTAIN CONCEPTS

1.1 Three Theories of Disease
In Part I of his 1943 Essay, Canguilhem introduces three theories of disease that
have influenced medical thought and practice from the time of Hippocrates until the
nineteenth century: the functional, ontological, and positivist.1 Two of these—the
functional and ontological theories—share the vision of disease as a polemical situation,
a struggle between opposing forces. On the one hand, functional theories totalize the
phenomenon of disease and establish it at the level of the total organism. Under this
conception, neither an organ nor a tissue can become sick; rather, the organism
experiences sickness in its entirety. Disease is therefore a sign of hope, since it signals the
restoration of the balance of the body via its own natural, internal mechanisms of healing.
Ontological theories, on the other hand, do not situate sickness at the level of the total
organism. Instead, sickness lodges itself somewhere within the body, and it remains the
task of medicine to first locate and then expel it. Under this conception, the possibility of
medicine and therapeutic intervention rests on the ability of the physician to localize the
disease in order to direct her efforts. In this way, ontological theories disavow nature and
put their faith in therapeutic and technological intervention. Despite their striking
differences, both of these theories maintain health and disease as separate entities. The
lived experience of both health and disease confirms the qualitative difference between
the two. Whereas these two representations of disease have existed and competed since

1

Georges Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, trans. Carolyn R. Fawcett
(New York: Urzone Inc., 1991), (hereafter cited in text as NP).

6

antiquity, the eighteenth century saw the formulation of a new theory: the positivist
conception of disease. Like the ontological theory before it, the positivist conception
seeks rational and effective medical intervention. To this end, it recasts health and disease
not as antipodal forces, but as quantifiable variations in one and the same normal
physiological process. From the perspective of medicine, the pathological and normal
become homogeneous, the former reduces to the latter. Although it seems qualitatively
different from health, the lived experience is nothing but illusion. In reality, the positivist
theory asserts, disease and health stand to one another as a relation of identity. This
section expounds and clarifies these three theories of disease presented by Canguilhem so
that we may recognize the fragments of these theories as they are deployed in
contemporary scientific and medical practices.

1.1.1 The Functional and Ontological Theories
The Greek tradition, founded upon the writings and teachings of Hippocrates,
represents disease as a dynamic phenomenon of disequilibrium and imbalance.
According to this conception, the healthy body is one that is in harmony with both itself
and nature. Four humors with opposite qualities of wet/dry and hot/cold maintain this
fluid equilibrium through regular fluctuations, with each counteracting and stabilizing the
changes in its opposite. The term ‗disease‘ describes ―the disturbance of this harmony, of
this equilibrium‖ (NP, 40). Represented in this way, disease is not localized to a
particular part of the body. Just as the dissonance produced by an out-of-tune instrument
destroys the entire melody, disease destroys the harmony of the total body. However, as
Canguilhem notes, in the Greek tradition disease is ―not simply disequilibrium or

7

discordance,‖ but more importantly, it is nature‘s attempt to recreate harmony and
establish a new equilibrium in the body. A body becomes sick, not in virtue of some
external cause, but rather because its internal equilibrium has been lost. In this sense,
disease is the mechanism of renewal and restoration; it is the ―generalized reaction‖ of
the total body aimed to restore the body to its proper balance, that is, ―to bring about a
cure‖ (NP, 41).
This functional, totalizing theory of disease greatly affects the goal of medicine. If
disease is nature‘s own therapy, then any therapeutic intervention that counteracts it will
be a hindrance to the reestablishment of equilibrium and health. Human medicine,
therefore, must imitate the action of nature, by augmenting and extending the natural
tendencies and movements. German poet Heinrich Heine expresses this relationship
between disease and cure in his account of God‘s reason for creation:
Illness was no doubt the final cause
of the whole urge to create.
By creating, I could recover;
by creating, I became healthy.
(Heine, Neue Gedichte, ―Schöpfungslieder VII‖)
For Heine‘s God, his disease carries within itself the impetus toward the creation that is
also its cure. God knows not to subvert but to follow the ―urge‖ brought on by disease to
reestablish equilibrium and recover his health. Like Heine‘s God, the doctor does not
interfere with the progression of the disease but, instead, helps it along its course. The
optimism in this conception of disease lies in a faith in nature. Disease is not to be feared,
for it, in itself, is the cure.
By contrast, ontological theories of disease, prevalent at least since the golden age
of ancient Egypt, attempt to localize the pathological phenomenon in order to act against
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it. An ontological conception of disease must pinpoint the site and source of the problem
in order to direct the medical intervention. While also optimistic, these theories place
faith not in nature but instead in medical and technical means. As an ontological fact
opposed to the healthy state, disease must enter the body ―as through a door‖ (NP, 39).
This metaphor again casts disease in a reassuring and hopeful light but for a different
reason than did Greek medicine: ―what man has lost can be restored to him, and what has
entered him can also leave‖ (NP, 39). Whatever disease takes possession of the body,
once effectively localized and circumscribed, it can be potentially cast out. Under this
conception, diseases can be ranked ―based on the extent to which symptoms can—or
cannot—be readily localized‖; hence, the more localizable the symptoms, the more real
the disease (NP, 39).
According to Canguilhem, the prevalence of these localizing, ontological
conceptions of disease leading up to the nineteenth century accelerated the reception of
Pasteur‘s germ theory of contagion, since his theory ―embodies an ontological
representation of sickness‖ (NP, 40). With the aid of diagnostic technologies, a microbe
or virus can be seen and distinguished from the human body. Unlike the Greek humors
and the miasmas thought to contribute to disease, the germ has its own separate existence
and being. Because it reinforces the connection between visibility, with its corresponding
localizability, and therapeutic intervention, Pasteur‘s germ theory supports and enables
action: ―To see an entity is already to foresee an action‖ (NP, 40). The germ theory of
contagion shares the motivating impulse Canguilhem locates behind all ontological
theories of disease—an optimism and faith in medical and technical intervention.
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These two opposing theories of disease have alternately dominated medical
representations of the pathological from the time of Hippocrates through the eighteenth
century. Both the totalizing conception founded upon Greek thought and the localizing
one reinforced by the work of Pasteur afford a certain optimism to the scientific
discipline of pathology. This optimism lends medical thought a ―good reason‖ for
utilizing ―one or the other attitude,‖ that is, either the totalizing or localizing theory, in
the explanation of new diseases (NP, 41). Of course, medical thought identifies a
tendency toward one theory or the other within the diseases themselves: ―Deficiency
diseases and all infectious or parasitic diseases favor the ontological theory, while
endocrine disturbances and all disease beginning with dys- support the dynamic or
functional theory‖ (NP, 41). Despite their differences, however, both theories understand
disease as ―a polemical situation‖ (NP, 41). Disease is a struggle, a contest, between a
pathogen or foreign substance and an organism or among internal opposing forces within
a body. For both theories, the relation between the normal and the pathological
phenomenon is qualitative. That is, in both configurations of disease, the pathological
state is radically distinct from the normal physiological state. The normal and the
diseased state are heterogeneous, defined by the presence or absence of a pathogen or
toxin in the case of the localizing, ontological conception or by the modification of the
entire organism in the case of the functional, totalizing representation. Whether the theory
leads humans to place their faith and hope in nature or medical intervention, as originally
formulated, both the localizing and totalizing theories of disease maintain a stark
qualitative divide between the normal and the pathological, and this simple fact grants
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them a certain affinity toward each other over and against the positivist conception of
disease.

1.1.2 The Positivist Theory
Developed in the eighteenth century, the positivist conception of disease arose
from an attempt to ground pathological phenomena within the normal physiology. Like
the localizing, ontological theory of disease, the positivist conception has an eye toward
technical and therapeutic intervention. In order to build a science of the pathological upon
a firm, rational foundation, proponents of this theory of disease characterized the
difference between the pathological and the normal as a matter of degree. According to
Auguste Comte and Claude Bernard, the two ―standardbearers‖ of this theory in
nineteenth-century France, disease and health are linked together on a quantitative scale
(NP, 46).
Although Canguilhem forcefully argues against this conception of disease, he
finds within the concurrent ideas a motivating impulse behind this theory. 2 The
normalizing desire to ―compel nature and bend it‖ away from the pathological back
toward the normal requires a clear linkage between these two seemingly different
2

Canguilhem, a careful philosopher of science, offers a note on his method:

The thesis whose meaning and importance we are trying to define [i.e., the positivist
theory of disease] has not been invented for the sake of the cause. The history of ideas
cannot be superimposed perforce on the history of science. But as scientists lead their
lives as men in an environment and social setting that is not exclusively scientific, the
history of science cannot neglect the history of ideas. (NP, 46)
From this methodological caveat, we cannot understand Canguilhem to be forcing the history of
science into the framework established by the ideas of the time. He assumes no direct causality
between the history of ideas and the history of science. Instead, he finds it useful—and even
necessary—to trace out the influences and overlap between the science of a historical epoch and
its ideas, beliefs, and motivations.
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phenomena (NP, 41). Thus, if the physician is to have any hope of helping the sick
person, she must understand the relationship that ties the pathological to the normal state.
Effective intervention demands the elucidation of this relationship. This theoretical need,
necessary for the establishment of a purely scientific pathology, led researchers to link
pathology to physiology. Canguilhem traces this evolution in thought through Morgagni,
who discovered that certain physiological and anatomical lesions corresponded to stable,
visible symptoms, leading him to conclude that disease has its basis in physiology.
Through the work of Morgagni, ―nosographical classification found a substratum in
anatomical analysis‖ (NP, 42). Defects in normal anatomy (i.e., pathological anatomy)
result in disease, just as health discloses the underlying normal anatomy. From the work
of Morgagni and other eighteenth-century scientists, ―pathology became a natural
extension of physiology‖ (NP, 42). With the link between physiology and pathology
secured, pathology required only one further step in order to become completely
rationalized. According to Canguilhem, this final step culminated in the positivist theory
of disease,
a theory of the relations between the normal and the pathological, according to
which the pathological phenomena found in living organisms are nothing more
than quantitative variations, greater or lesser according to the corresponding
physiological phenomena. (NP, 42)
Through this evolution in medical thought, a positivist conception of disease came to
prominence in pathology in the nineteenth century.
As expounded by Comte and Bernard, this new conception of the pathological
distances itself from both the totalizing (functional) and localizing (ontological)
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representations of disease.3 Whereas both previous theories envisaged disease as a battle
between ―qualitatively opposed‖ forces, the positivist conception considers disease as one
end of a continuum that connects the normal and the pathological (NP, 42). Disease is not
antithetical to health; it is a mere quantitative modification of it. As Canguilhem notes,
this quantitative relation between the normal and the pathological essentially collapses
the distinction back upon itself. The positivist theory, which interprets pathological
phenomena as nothing but an excess or deficiency in relation to the normal state, attempts
to ―annul the pathological‖ (NP, 43). In this account, the lived experience of disease has
no place, and the qualitative difference in experience between sickness and health is not
reality but a mere appearance. More than existing together on a continuum, according to
Bernard, the normal and the pathological exist in a relation of identity: ―health and
disease are not two essentially different modes.‖ 4 Any supposed qualitative difference is
relegated to the level of appearance since at the level of reality there exists an essential
sameness between the normal and pathological phenomena. Despite its affinities to the
ontological theory of disease in its goal of medical intervention, the positivist account
denies any real difference between sickness and health and reduces pathological
phenomena to the normal physiological state.
Although these three theories of disease are distinct representations of the
phenomenon of sickness and are developed as independent theories, their points of
convergence and divergence allow some to be deployed as correctives to others. For

3

In this section, I will only briefly sketch the main tenets and ramifications of the
positivist conception of disease in order to distinguish it from the previous two theories. In
section 1.2 ―Point of View,‖ I will address this theory in more detail.
4

Claude Bernard, Leçons sur la chaleur animale (Paris: J.-B. Baillière, 1877), 391,
quoted at NP, 71.
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instance, Canguilhem argues against the positivist conception of disease in favor of a
qualitative distinction between the normal and the pathological. Referring back to the
1943 Essay at the end of The Normal and the Pathological, Canguilhem summarizes his
earlier work as a comparison of ―the ontological conception of disease … with the
positivist conception‖ (NP, 275). In this dichotomy, Canguilhem obviously sides with the
ontological conception. However, while forwarding his claims, he continually deploys
totalizing representations and metaphors from the functional theory of disease to correct
what he views are the localizing tendencies within the ontological conception. To a
certain extent, he retrospectively classifies both the functional and ontological theories as
―ontological‖ to emphasize their opposition to the quantitative reduction of the
pathological to the normal in the positivist conception. Although this is merely one
example, it illustrates the crucial point that these three theories of disease can be
regrouped, reconfigured, and redeployed to describe new phenomena of pathogenesis.

1.2 Point of View
Canguilhem‘s analysis of the ontological and positivist theories of disease invokes
a slew of dualisms—qualitative–quantitative, value–fact, appearance–reality, subjective–
objective—all of which emphasize the perspectival aspect of the theoretical concepts,
both normal and pathological. The ontological and positivist theories adopt a point of
view either of the subjective experience of the sick person or of the objective
determinations of theoretical pathology. The positivist conception of disease, which
receives the brunt of Canguilhem‘s criticism, adopts the latter stance. By reducing disease
to a quantitative variation of normal physiology, it maintains the qualitatively different
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experiences of sickness and health in the living body are mere appearances masking the
underlying reality—the homogeneity of the normal and the pathological. For Broussais,
Comte, Bernard, and Leriche the subjective point of view inherent in the ontological
theories has no place within an analysis of disease; the positivist conception to which
they adhere aims to excise all traces of subjectivity. However, as Canguilhem‘s analysis
demonstrates, this attempt to develop a purely objective pathology fails. According to
Canguilhem, the very nature of the phenomenon of disease, and of life in general, resists
formalization and objectification. At the foundation of the positivist theory of disease
remains an ineradicable core of the subjective experience of the living organism.

1.2.1 The Objective Point of View: Broussais, Comte, Bernard, and Leriche
The desire for the rationalization and mathematization of knowledge in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led pathologists to formulate a purely objective
conception of disease. By linking the pathological to the normal physiology and denying
any qualitative difference between the two, these thinkers attempted to develop a concept
of disease that excluded all subjectivity. In fact, however, they succeeded in developing a
theory that only purported to be purely objective by stubbornly overlooking the role of
the subjective in theoretical conceptions of disease.
The positivist conception of disease as developed in the nineteenth century by
Comte and Bernard strove for pure objectivity. Maintaining the ―real identity‖ of the
pathological and corresponding physiological phenomena, this theory invokes the
subjective–objective distinction in order to reify the latter and discount the former (NP,

15

47).5 Although at odds with the human experience of disease, this conception establishes
a parallel between the subjective–objective points of view and the philosophical
appearance–reality distinction. The scientific perspective thus grasps the true reality of
the phenomenon of disease, whereas the patient‘s limited point of view cannot pierce
through the appearance (e.g., the experience of pain or eroding function) to perceive the
underlying reality. Despite the apparent difference and ―opposing values‖ accorded to the
normal and the pathological by the living being on this account, these phenomena are
essentially identical, differing in degree but not in kind (NP, 43). The truth of disease is
to be found in the principle developed by Broussais and adopted by Comte in which
diseases ―are only symptoms,‖ the expression of underlying lesions in the organs and
tissues (NP, 47). Since diseases are merely superficial symptoms or epiphenomena, the
subjective experience of disease does not grasp the physiological reality. In reality all
diseases, according to Broussais, are therefore nothing more than an ―excitation in
various tissues above or below the degree established as the norm‖ (NP, 47-48). The
disease or ―symptoms‖ experienced by the patient are epiphenomena that point to the
―simple changes in intensity‖ of the corresponding physiological phenomena (NP, 48).
Through recourse to Broussais‘ principle, the positivist conception of disease attempts to
reduce the subjective perspective of the patient to the objective perspective of the
physician.

5

Canguilhem culls this discussion of the real or essential identity of the pathological and
physiological phenomena directly from Bernard‘s formulation of the positivist theory. According
to Canguilhem, it is an attempt on the part of the positivist thinkers to annul the subjective
experience of disease. The qualitative difference experienced by the sick organism is nothing but
appearance. This theory claims to move beyond this appearance to the level of reality, which
reveals the essential relation to be one of identity. However, as I will note later, even this theory
itself was unable to consistently deny any and all qualitative distinctions between health and
disease.
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Although it excludes subjective, qualitative differences from consideration, this
theory, which aims to establish the essential identity of the pathological and the
underlying physiology, permits, or rather demands, a quantitative differentiation between
health and disease. The necessity for a quantitative scale of physiological functions arises
from the disavowal of any real qualitative distinction. According to Canguilhem, the
quantification and development of a continuum of phenomena is a logical necessity if the
positivist theory is to retain the concept of the pathological, even if it only admits of
pathological phenomena on the level of appearance. He affirms, ―Logically speaking, it is
quite correct that an identification of phenomena, whose qualitative differences are
considered illusory, takes the form of a quantification‖ (NP, 61). This ―assertion of
identity‖ and denial of any real ―qualitative difference‖ between the pathological and
physiological phenomena ―must lead‖ to the assertion of ―a homogeneity capable of
expression in quantitative terms‖ (NP, 53).6
Although Comte never quite made this final step, Bernard was fully aware of this
logical demand. In his work on diabetes, he elaborates the positivist theory and its
ramifications for the understanding of disease. Following Broussais and Comte, he
affirms the identity of the pathological and the corresponding physiological phenomena:
―Physiology and pathology are intermingled and are essentially one and the same thing.‖ 7
He continues, ―Every disease has a corresponding normal function of which it is only the
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disturbed, exaggerated, diminished or obliterated expression.‖8 Thus, for Bernard, disease
is nothing new to the organism; it is not ―an extra-physiological entity‖ (NP, 68). At this
point Bernard surpasses Comte in his analysis, for in addition to asserting the identity of
the pathological and the physiological, he demonstrates the possibility of quantitative
differentiation between the normal and the pathological. Although the pathological is
―essentially‖ identical to the normal physiology, they can be measured and ordered by the
―intensity which varies in the normal state and in the diseased state.‖9 Bernard‘s
formulation thus permits the retention of the distinction between the normal and the
pathological while creating a continuum of normal and pathological phenomena, which
purportedly ensures an entirely objective criterion for disease.
To bolster his assertion of continuity, Bernard portrays this continuum between
the normal and the pathological as an offshoot of his mechanistic commitment to the
continuity of life and death. The relation between life and death or organic and inorganic
is analogous to the relation between health and disease. According to Bernard, ―health
and disease are not two essentially different modes,‖ and neither are the organic and the
inorganic.10 Both conceptual pairs are not different in kind but, rather, differ solely in
degree. Canguilhem finds support for this interpretation of Bernard‘s thought in
Bernard‘s response to two Italian physiologists who attempted to establish a qualitative
distinction between life and death. These physiologists disputed Bernard‘s findings that
the heat generated upon the severing of a vital nerve was a mere variation in the normal
physiological heat. On the contrary, they held that the heat produced was ―morbid‖ and
8
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―different in every respect from physiological heat,‖ since it originated in a different kind
of combustion (NP, 72). Bernard chastises the Italians for failing to recognize the
―universal applicability‖ of the determinist laws of nature (NP, 73):
In reality, physico-chemical manifestations do not change in nature, whether they
take place inside or outside the organism, in a healthy or diseased state. There is
only one kind of calorific agent; whether it is produced in a furnace or in an
organism it is none the less the same. There cannot be physical heat and animal
heat, still less, morbid heat and physiological heat. Morbid animal heat and
physiological heat differ only in degree, not in their nature.11
In this response, Bernard argues by analogy to support his assertion of the continuity of
the normal and the pathological. The heat produced from a normal and a pathological
process follow the same mechanistic laws, just as normal and pathological phenomena in
the living being follow the same laws of physiology.
According to Canguilhem, this argument lacks force since it neglects to consider
the two different points of view at stake: the point of view of the living being and that of
the function under consideration. Utilizing Bernard‘s example of glycosuria (excretion of
sugar in the urine) in the diabetic patient, Canguilhem extracts these two points of view.
On the one hand, if one considers the function or mechanism ―in itself,‖ then glycosuria
can be expressed as a difference from the normal physiological glycemia as a simple
excess, a difference in quantity which surpasses a certain threshold (NP, 78). When
considered in this light, Bernard‘s claim is perfectly accurate. The physical and chemical
laws governing this particular function do not admit discontinuities or variations. On the
other hand, if one considers glycosuria as the living being‘s ―principle symptom‖ of
diabetes, then the pathological state is not an extension of the physiological state, but
rather ―a new quality‖ entirely (NP, 78). This failure to account for both the objective and
11
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subjective points of view renders Bernard‘s theory ―inadequate and incomplete‖ (NP,
82). As Canguilhem‘s analysis reveals ―we have a pathological phenomenon which can
be defined in terms of quality or quantity depending on one‘s point of view‖ (NP, 79). By
overlooking the subjective point of view, the positivist conception of disease as
developed by Bernard offers no solution to this ambiguity. For the positive conception of
disease, the question of how to adjudicate between the two points of view never even
arises, since it does not recognize any real distinction between the two.
Despite the development of the positivist conception of disease from Broussais‘
principle through Comte to its logical culmination in Bernard, Canguilhem argues, this
theory fails to establish a purely objective pathology. According to Canguilhem,
Bernard‘s formulation does not meet even the strictly logical demands of the theory. He
objects to the claim that the continuity of the physiological and pathological phenomena
ensures their homogeneity. On the contrary, Canguilhem asserts, ―The continuity of the
middle stages does not rule out the diversity of the extremes‖ (NP, 56). In other words, it
may be possible to measure pathological and physiological states according to intensity
and situate them on the same quantitative continuum while nevertheless maintaining a
real qualitative difference between the two. In support of his criticism, Canguilhem points
to the inability of the proponents of the positivist theory to sustain the language of
identity and homogeneity throughout their works. Even the standardbearers of the theory
sometimes slip into language suggestive of a qualitative distinction between
physiological and pathological phenomena. For example, Broussais writes of diseases,
―[they] increase, decrease, interrupt, [and] corrupt,‖ slipping from the quantitative
language of intensities—increase, decrease, interrupt—to the value-laden, qualitative
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notion of corruption.12 Canguilhem points out similar instances in both Comte and
Bernard, highlighting their inability to categorically exclude qualitative distinctions
between the pathological and the physiological. 13 Furthermore, Canguilhem exposes the
futility of the positivist attempt to render the study of the pathological purely objective
without a means to objectively define the normal. This insight brings to light a ―serious
gap‖ in Comte (and also Bernard) since his account of disease ―provides no criterion
which would allow us to know what a normal phenomenon is‖ (NP, 53). To uphold their
purportedly objective conceptions of disease, these thinkers need to prove both that a
purely objective definition of the normal is possible and that ―all the differences between
the normal state and the pathological state could be expressed in quantitative terms‖ (NP,
57). According to Canguilhem‘s analysis, the positive conception of disease fails on both
counts and thus falls short of pure objectivity.
The positivist theory of disease advanced by Broussais, Comte, and Bernard is
not simply a chapter from an obsolete history of nosology. The reverberations of this
early nineteenth-century theory were still felt when Canguilhem published his Essay in
1943. In fact, René Leriche, who occupied Bernard‘s chair of medicine at the Collège de
France at that time, maintained committed to further developing the positivist conception
of a purely objective pathology, according to Canguilhem. Even though he at first defines
disease as ―what irritates men‖ and ―what makes them suffer,‖ Leriche offers an account
of disease that, in the same vein as his predecessors, invalidates the point of view of the

12

François-Joseph-Victor Broussais, Traité de physiologie appliquée à la pathologie
(Paris: Mlle. Delauney, 1822-23), 114, quoted at NP, 56.
13

See NP, 56 and NP, 76 for examples of this slippage from quantitative to qualitative
language in Comte and Bernard, respectively.

21

living organism. 14 Unlike the nineteenth-century pathologists, Leriche does indeed
recognize both the subjective and objective perspectives under which disease makes its
appearance, yet, according to Canguilhem, he immediately hierarchizes them, privileging
the objective, ―for this definition of disease is that of the sick man, not that of the doctor;
and valuable though it is from the point of view of awareness, it is not the point of view
of science‖ (NP, 92). The critical problem with endorsing a subjective point of view in an
analysis of disease for Leriche is the prodigality and superfluity of the human body: the
body contains more kidneys than necessary for the secretion of urine, more liver than
required for the purification of the blood, more lungs than needed for respiration, etc.
This overabundance of organs and tissues performing the same functions creates a
temporal delay in the conscious awareness of a disturbance in the body. Thus, for the
sake of an objective pathology, according to Leriche, disease ―must be dehumanized.‖ 15
This conclusion leads Leriche back to the objective perspective adopted by Broussais,
Comte, and Bernard in which the conscious experience of disease by the organism is
merely an epiphenomenon or symptom of an underlying ―anatomical alteration or
physiological disturbance‖ (NP, 92). On this account, the appearance of the disease in
consciousness is a bona fide sign of the reality of disease on the physiological level, but it
is not a necessary and sufficient condition. As Canguilhem notes, Leriche‘s dehumanized
definition of disease does not require any conscious awareness. Since the reality of
disease resides at the level of tissues, it is completely plausible to have disease without a
sick person. By eschewing the perspective of the sick person, Leriche‘s theory, in its

René Leriche, ―Introduction générale‖; ―De la santé à la maladie‖; ―La douleur dans les
maladies‖; ―Où va la médecine?‖ Encyclopédie français vol. 6, 1936, 22-23, quoted at NP, 91.
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attempt to rationalize medicine and therapeutic techniques, ironically creates diseases
where there were previously none: ―The disease which never existed in the man‘s
consciousness begins to exist in the physician‘s science‖ (NP, 92). For Leriche as for his
predecessors, the objective perspective of the scientist and physician has the exclusive
dominion over the reality of disease and thus necessarily overrides any consideration of
the subjective perspective, which fails to move beyond the appearance to the fundamental
reality of disease.

1.2.2 The Subjective Point of View: Canguilhem
In his critique of positivist pathology, Canguilhem attempts to counter the
pervasive trend in that discipline which discounts the point of view of the living
organism. Siding with the subjective perspective of disease, he argues that the positivist
dream of a purely objective pathology is impossible. Disease, according to Canguilhem,
is a totalizing phenomenon, which occurs only at the level of consciousness. Although
the theoretical pathology of Broussais, Comte, Bernard, and Leriche aims to dehumanize
disease, Canguilhem claims the subjective, human perspective forms an ineradicable core
upon which any science of disease must be founded. The positivist conception of disease
tries to distance itself from clinical practice, but, as Canguilhem demonstrates, even this
objective pathology requires the subjective experience to differentiate the normal from
the pathological.
Responding to the question of point of view raised but unanswered by Bernard‘s
analysis, Canguilhem argues that the subjective point of view is primary within this
conception of disease. He supports this conclusion through his reassessment of glycosuria

23

in diabetics. The pathological phenomenon of glycosuria permits both a quantitative and
a qualitative description. Depending upon the point of view (i.e., that of the patient or
physician) and level of the observation (i.e., that of the total organism or tissues), this
pathological phenomenon presents itself in two different guises; it appears completely
differently. In order to adjudicate between these two points of view, can we not follow
the nineteenth-century pathologists and fall back upon the appearance–reality distinction?
By invoking this perennial philosophical distinction, the physician and pathologist could
insouciantly disregard the point of view of the patient, since their obligation is to a
rigorous, objective pathology. ―Is it not obvious,‖ Canguilhem writes, ―that if we want to
work out a scientific pathology we must consider real causes and not apparent effects,
functional mechanisms and not their symptomatic expressions?‖ (NP, 79; emphasis
added). On this account, the object of the science of pathology is not the total organism
but rather the scientific laws and quantitative relations of chemical equilibria, governing
the chemical reactions and movements of dissolved molecules. This mechanistic
reduction of the living organism to a system of physio-chemical deterministic laws would
solve the problem of point of view if it were possible.
However, according to Canguilhem, the living being resists such description:
biological thresholds are not ―barriers,‖ and the internal regulations of the living being
are not ―safety valves, servo-brakes or thermostats‖ (NP, 79). In the case of the biological
regulation of glycosuria, two diabetics—with all other things being equal—can exhibit
vastly different amounts of glucose passed in the urine. This variance certainly depends
upon the individual norms of the organisms, but fluctuations within the same organism
indicate that renal thresholds are ―essentially mobile‖ and that renal ―behavior‖ is not
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fixed and quantifiable by mechanistic laws.16 Canguilhem interprets these twentiethcentury scientific findings as proof that the biological regulation of blood glucose ―cannot
be entirely translated into analytical and quantitative terms‖ (NP, 80). The change from
normal urinary excretion to glycosuria is better described as a qualitative transformation
of the kidneys rather than a mere quantitative movement along a continuum: ―To become
a diabetic is to change kidneys‖ (NP, 80). Canguilhem‘s redescription of this pathological
phenomenon in light of twentieth-century scientific findings exposes the shortcomings in
the positivist dream of a purely objective pathology. The living being and its biological
―behavior‖ thwart the pathologist‘s attempt at a complete reduction to physical laws and
quantifiable relations, thus demanding that pathology take into account the subjective
point of view of the living being.
This subjective perspective of disease, which resists reduction to a quantifiable
extension of the normal physiology, necessarily exists at the level of the total organism. If
health is ―life lived in the silence of the organs,‖ as Leriche claims and Canguilhem
affirms, then disease occurs when that silence is broken and the organism experiences
suffering and pain. 17 The phenomenon of disease from the subjective point of view thus
presents itself as an ―event involving the living organism taken as a whole‖ (NP, 80). By
contrast, from the objective point of view disease appears as localized in a particular
organ or tissue, for instance, in the kidneys and urine in glycosuria or in the basal ganglia
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in Parkinson‘s disease. 18 In this way, the subjective and objective perspectives align
themselves with the totalizing ontological conception and the localizing positivist
theories of disease respectively, adding to the laundry list of dualisms that arise within a
consideration of point of view.
Although Canguilhem argues for this subjective perspective of disease at the level
of the total organism, he does not aim to radically annul the objective point of view
cultivated by the positivist conception of disease. Instead, his analysis merely aims to
reopen pathology to make room for the subjective point of view. The restrictions
positivist pathology places on itself in its quest for pure objectivity unnecessarily
impoverish it to the detriment of the living beings who seek to benefit from it. Therefore,
Canguilhem aims to resuscitate the subjective perspective of the sick being, not via the
extirpation of the objective perspective, but rather by altering the hierarchy between these
two points of view. On Canguilhem‘s theory of disease, the localized focus on a
particular physiological site remains ―privileged,‖ but it is no longer ―absolute‖ (NP, 81).
That is to say, the pathologist or physician must still take into account the function that
deviates from the so-called physiological norm, but she must be able to account for this
on the level of the total organism. Without expanding this traditionally myopic view,
positivist pathology risks labeling symptoms as disease with potentially disastrous results
for the patient. For example, if pathology rests content with the localized diagnosis of a
hyperactive pituitary gland, it will fail to grasp the interrelation of this symptom to ―a
pituitary tumor or a general endocrinal readjustment‖ on the level of the total organism
(NP, 81). In his zeal to reestablish the subjective point of view of the sick being and the
18

The objective point of view always attempts to localize the pathological phenomenon.
Even for diseases that seem to have amorphous origins and ambiguous locations, the objective
point of view strives to pinpoint the precise location in the body.

26

qualitative distinction between sickness and health, Canguilhem slips into the language of
the appearance–reality distinction. He claims, in the study of disease, ―what appears to be
partial augmentation or diminution is in fact an alteration in the whole‖ (NP, 81). Despite
this regression to the philosophically tired appearance–reality distinction, Canguilhem‘s
point is well taken; namely, the meaning and human reality of disease is not at the level
of partial function but at the level of the total organism.
The phenomenon of pain supports this shift in emphasis in pathology from the
localizing to the totalizing perspective. According to Canguilhem, pain, for Leriche, is
neither ―a physiological sensation‖ nor ―an expression of a normal activity‖ (NP, 96). As
outside the natural laws of a species, pain presents not as a symptom of disease, but as
disease itself. It is an ―accident‖ which violates the ―laws of normal sensation,‖ ―a
monstrous individual phenomenon.‖19 This representation of pain as an accident and a
violation of the normal physiology distances Leriche from his positivist predecessors. As
Canguilhem notes, when Leriche divorces pain from the continuum of physiological
function, it becomes an ―authentically abnormal state‖ (NP, 96). Crucially for
Canguilhem, this concept of pain-disease can only occur at the level of the total
individual: ―It seems quite important to us that a doctor recognize in pain a phenomenon
of total reaction which makes sense, which is a sensation only at the level of concrete
human individuality‖ (NP, 97). In addition, this description of pain reinforces the
subjective perspective of disease. Pain as disease presents itself at the level of a
biological value judgment; it does not appear as a choice, yet arises as a response of life
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to its milieu.20 Of course, as a fact, it can be disputed and reduced to nerve impulses by
the physiologist just as the physicist reduces the sight of color to a function of light
wavelengths, but as a value expressed by the life of the being, pain and disease are
irreducible. Leriche‘s concept of pain-disease halts any attempt to situate disease within a
localized function or partial aspect of the organism. In the experience of pain, ―we obtain
the total coincidence of disease and the diseased person‖ (NP, 98).21
These shifts in emphasis advocated by Canguilhem—from partial function to total
organism, from objective pathology to the subjective awareness of disease—at first blush
might appear to be nothing but a reactionary humanist response to the ‗progress‘ of
rational pathology. Despite the impressive collection of evidence Canguilhem marshals to
support his arguments, the realignment of pathology with the experience of the sick
person away from quantifiable analysis seems to be a regression. How can we overlook
the time lag between the so-called onset of disease and the awareness of the organism
pointed out by Leriche? What would happen to modern medicine if we waited for the
testimony of the patient‘s pain or her awareness of a decrease in function rather than
diagnosing breast cancer via x-ray technology and HIV infection via Western blot
analysis? Canguilhem is not unaware of these concerns. Unlike the objective point of
view which seeks to eradicate any subjective contribution to the study of disease,
Canguilhem does not advocate a renunciation of medical technologies and quantitative
analysis. Rather than arguing for the overthrow of rationality and mathematization in
The unique qualities Canguilhem attributes to life are discussed in section 1.3.1 ―Life
as Normative.‖
20

Canguilhem‘s theory of disease upholds the subjective point of view. That is, he insists
that disease occurs at the level of consciousness and that recognition of the disease depends upon
the sick being itself. Thus, to a large extent, Canguilhem‘s formulation is only relevant for human
diseases.
21

28

pathology, he merely aims to demonstrate that the project of positivist pathology cannot
even get off the ground without the account of disease offered by the sick person. The
concept of disease itself is not ―a concept of objective reality accessible to quantitative
scientific knowledge‖ (NP, 76). Instead, Canguilhem argues this concept must be
supplied by the living organism. Today‘s medicine has laboratory techniques and
diagnostic tests ―which allow [it] to see ‗patients‘ in people who do not feel that way‖
only because it rests on the testimony and experiences of yesterday‘s patients (NP, 93).
According to Canguilhem,
[i]f, today, the physician‘s knowledge of disease can anticipate the sick man‘s
experience of it, it is because at one time this experience gave rise to, summed up,
that knowledge. Hence medicine always exists de jure, if not de facto, because
there are men who feel sick, not because there are doctors to tell men of their
illnesses. (NP, 93)
It is only the subjective experience of disease in the past that allows physicians to
objectively anticipate disease in the future. Therefore, the subjective experience of
disease as a distinctively different state of being for the organism cannot be shrugged off,
explained away, or labeled as illusory by the pathologist, since it serves as the necessary
foundation for the science of pathology itself. Although contemporary diagnostic
medicine masks its relation to past subjective experiences in a veil of objectivity, what
Canguilhem exposes is the ―permanent relationship of the sick man and disease‖ (NP,
93).
According to Canguilhem, the motivation for the positivist denial of ontological
theories of disease resides in a ―deeper refusal to confirm evil‖ (NP, 104). However, he
claims this outcome is not a necessary result of adopting a subjective theory of disease.
The recognition of disease as an ontologically distinct state of being does not require the
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confirmation of disease as evil. Of course, the positivist account does effectively avoid
this result, since if the pathological is reducible to an extension of the normal, then it has
no ontological substance of its own and cannot be an instantiation of evil. But this is not
the only way to avoid the coupling of disease and evil. As Canguilhem notes, it is
possible to ―deny that disease is a kind of violation of the organism … without denying‖
the novelty of disease (NP, 87). Thus, we can interpret disease, not as a step on the road
toward death, but rather as inaugurating a new way of life for the living being. The
positivist point of view attempts to reduce the normal and the pathological to a ―common
measure,‖ but in so doing it strips both concepts of their meaning (NP, 110). Therefore, if
we are to retain the qualitative experience of disease—an experience which, according to
Canguilhem, can be denied but not suppressed—then we must accept the validity of the
sick being‘s point of view as crucial to the understanding of both the meaning and the
treatment of disease.

1.3 The Norm and the Normal
For Canguilhem‘s analysis, the norm and the normal are two absolutely
fundamental concepts. Since his understanding and development of these concepts is
complex and nuanced, this section will necessarily be an incomplete exposition. Rather
than attempt to encapsulate all their many features on these few pages, I have elected to
discuss three distinct aspects of these concepts or ramifications that following from
defining these concepts as Canguilhem does. The focus of the first section is
Canguilhem‘s discussion of life as a normative process. However, for Canguilhem, the
term normative has a very specific meaning, different from its typical English usage. A
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living being is normative according to Canguilhem insofar as it is ―capable of
establishing new, even organic norms‖ (NP, 139). Also pertinent to this discussion is
Canguilhem‘s description of life. For him, life is not an indifferent phenomenon. That is,
unlike physics or chemistry, biological life, in itself, strives for continued existence and
prefers certain conditions over others. This striving is not at the level of the conscious
individual, but at the level of life itself. Thus, life reveals itself as ―polarized reactivity,‖
or an ―unconscious position of value‖ (NP, 126). In other words, life is not indifferent to
its conditions, either the external or internal environment, but instead, always takes up a
position of value and orients itself toward a positive or more favorable condition away
from a negative one.22 In the middle section, I turn to Canguilhem‘s discussion of the
variability of individual norms while the third section addresses one of the ramifications
of Canguilhem‘s concept of normatively, what I term the relativism of norms. Here, I
follow Canguilhem‘s explication to show that despite the fact that norms govern both the
normal and the pathological, there is still a way to establish a hierarchy of norms, thus
avoiding a radical relativism.

1.3.1 Life as Normative
For Canguilhem, the norm and the normal are two of the most fundamental
concepts within the study of disease. Indeed, medicine, in order to operate, constantly
invokes norms. Its primary goal, according to Canguilhem, is the reestablishment of
biological and physiological norms and the restoration of the organism‘s normal state.
Simultaneously functioning as both a fact and a value, the concept of the normal state
22

For a discussion of the anthropomorphism imbedded within the concept of life, see

note 23.

31

claims to define the habitual function of the organs and also purports to establish itself as
the ideal state. Any deviation from this ―habitual ideal‖ justifies therapeutic intervention
into the life of the living being (NP, 126). It is in relation to the normal, ideal state and
the habitual norms of the organs that all illnesses present themselves. Thus, according to
Canguilhem, the concept of the normal state with its corresponding norms holds the
power to determine both sickness and health. Bringing to light the fundamental role of
biological norms and the normal state within diagnostic medicine and therapeutic
intervention, Canguilhem questions the foundation of these norms.
At first Canguilhem considers two possibilities: either medicine or the living
being sets the biological normal. In the former case, the normal would achieve its status
as the normal because it is the end goal of therapeutic intervention. That is, the normal is
normal since medicine deems it ―a good goal to obtain‖ (NP, 126). The latter case inverts
this relation of causality: the living organism sets the norm and calls upon medicine to
restore that originary level of function. According to Canguilhem, this latter description,
where the living being sets its own functional and habitual norms, accurately grasps the
relation between medicine and the normal state. Similar to his stance against positivist
medicine, this assertion once again displays Canguilhem‘s insistence that clinical
medicine is beholden to the subjective point of view. However, in this instance,
Canguilhem claims that the life of the living being and not its subjective consciousness
establishes its normal state. To invoke Canguilhem‘s terminology, life itself is normative;
that is, life functions by establishing its own norms. The feature of the living being that
affords it this normative power is not at the level of conscious awareness but rather at the
level of life itself. Although the sick human may have awareness of her pain or sickness,
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according to Canguilhem, it is life itself that ascribes a positive or negative value
judgment to health or disease. Life itself is ―an unconscious position of value,‖ and as
such it is the demands of life that compel the conscious living being to ―call certain
dreaded states or behaviors pathological‖ (NP, 126). Thus, according to Canguilhem, life
itself—not objective pathology—constitutes and determines the biological norms for the
living being.
In this way, life is a normative activity that constantly evaluates certain biological
facts against a norm. By providing its own norms, life sets its own optimal mode of
existence. Unlike chemistry or physics, biology can go awry. That is to say, of these three
sciences, only biology admits of pathology. There is no pathological physics or
chemistry, since these sciences obey invariant natural laws. While the direction of a
chemical reaction may change depending upon the concentrations of the reactants and
products (i.e., whether the reaction goes in the forward or reverse direction, from
reactants to products or vice versa), the laws of chemistry governing the reaction remain
constant. If the reaction proceeds in the reverse direction due to a high concentration of
products, chemists do not label this an abnormal or pathological reaction. The laws of
chemistry are not normative; they do not establish norms. Therefore, no violations and no
deviations can occur in chemistry. Rather, the laws of chemistry are indifferent to the
direction in which a reaction proceeds. Likewise, in physics, a science built upon the
principle of inertia, there can be no ―distinction between natural and violent movements,‖
since ―inertia is precisely an indifference with respect to directions and variations in
movement‖ (NP, 128). All motions described by mechanics and all reactions
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characterized by chemistry are equal. Neither of these sciences adopt a norm which could
separate the normal from the abnormal, the normal from the pathological.
In contrast, biology is not indifferent to its conditions. Not all biological actions
and reactions are normal and equally favored by life. When an organism fails to excrete
wastes and toxins build up within the organs, the poisoning of the organism certainly
occurs according to the laws of chemistry and physics—these laws are not violated.
However, while this process follows certain inviolable laws, according to Canguilhem,
―none of this follows the norm‖ (NP, 129). He continues, ―there is no biological
indifference‖ (NP, 129). The vital therapeutic response of the living organism provides
evidence of this unique attribute of life. Canguilhem points to the self-restorative and
self-healing behaviors of animals, even animals low on the phylogenetic evolutionary
tree. 23 These behaviors express the unconscious position of value established at the level
of the total organism. According to Canguilhem,
[w]e … think that the fact that a living man reacts to a lesion, infection, functional
anarchy by means of a disease, expresses the fundamental fact that life is not
indifferent to the conditions in which it is possible, that life is polarity and thereby
even an unconscious position of value. (NP, 126)
This assertion reflects his understanding of life as polarized reactivity. That is, for
Canguilhem, life always evaluates its milieu, separating the various conditions into
preferred and nonpreferred, striving toward the former and away from the latter. This
reactivity of life is also reflected in the actions of the living being: ―The living human
being, in a more or less lucid way, extends a spontaneous effort, peculiar to life, to
Wary of a ―tendency to fall into anthropomorphism‖ in his description of life,
Canguilhem offers this example as a corrective (NP, 127). Even ―lower living organisms‖ exhibit
these behaviors aimed at healing and restoration, thus revealing the therapeutic need as a vital
need, essential to life (NP, 127). However, I believe Canguilhem is still open to this objection. In
The Normal and the Pathological, Canguilhem frequently employs the term life in his
explanations and interpretations, yet he neglects to adequately define this term.
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struggle against that which obstructs its preservation and development taken as norms‖
(NP, 126). However, this polarized reactivity exists not only at the level of animal
awareness, but also at the level of life itself. For example, the ability of blood to clot and
tissues to form scars indicates the life of the living being is not indifferent to puncture
wounds and torn tissues. If it were, these natural biological responses would be
unnecessary. But this is not the case. Life, in fact, reacts to these unfavorable conditions
in an attempt to reestablish the norms necessary for its own survival. As an unconscious
judgment of value, life itself establishes certain states as the normal and others as
pathological. The response of life itself—its dynamic reactivity—exists between the
opposite poles of the negatively- and positively-valued conditions, and biological and
environmental facts are positive and negative only insofar as life deems them to be
beneficial or harmful. Establishing its own norms, life identifies all that is judged to be of
negative vital value and exerts a ―spontaneous effort of defense against [it]‖ (NP, 131).
Thus, Canguilhem claims, the concept of the normal, instrumental for all therapeutic
intervention, is not imposed upon the living being by the science of medicine nor does it
come directly from the level of subjective consciousness, but rather represents the
judgment of life itself.

1.3.2 Individual Norms
Biological norms exhibit individual relativity. What is normal for one person may
be pathological for another. Although physiology and biometry measure, quantify, and
catalog physiological constants and analyze their frequency within a population, these
sciences and their statistics, by themselves, are helpless to establish the demarcation
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between the normal and the pathological. ―Statistics,‖ as Canguilhem reiterates, ―offer no
means for deciding whether a divergence is normal or abnormal‖ (NP, 155). Therefore,
the individual patient from her affective point of view must supply this division to the
physician and physiologist. Responding to the polarized activity of the life within her, the
patient experiences the onset of disease and the return to normality unfolding in time.
According to Canguilhem, the phenomenon of disease presents itself at the level of the
concrete individual, thus it remains the task of the particular living organism—the
patient—to determine when she has fallen ill and when therapeutic intervention has
restored her to her particular normal state.
Recognizing the metaphysical underpinnings of the concept of disease, most
practicing physicians avoid a careful scrutiny of the concept. Instead, Canguilhem claims,
they leave the classification of disease and cure to the patient, and with good reason, for
the physician only encounters disease when the individual experiences a reduction in
capabilities. In other words, the patient seeks out the doctor in order ―to be raised from an
abyss of impotence or suffering,‖ and as soon as her suffering has abated and she has
regained an adequate level of functioning, she defines herself as well (or well enough)
and retracts the plea for help that originally sent her to the doctor (NP, 119). It is the
patient, not the physician, who lives the phenomenon of sickness; she is the one who
must grapple with this metaphysical concept. Of course, for the determination of
biological norms, physicians do have recourse to physiology and the standards of their
social milieu. These external, but not invariant, factors establish a baseline of capacities
and functions considered necessary for an individual to be normal in a certain epoch and
social milieu. However, this concession to external, ‗objective‘ criteria of normality does
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not radically undermine the critical importance of the subjective experience of disease,
since normality does not have an upper limit. 24 So long as the patient‘s conception of her
return to health and normal functioning is above this baseline, the physician should
accept the patient‘s judgment of value.
This deference to the opinion and self-assessment of the patient amounts to a
recognition of the temporal aspect of disease. Unlike an anomaly, disease manifests itself
in ―chronological succession‖ (NP, 138). For the living organism, disease is an event that
―interrupts a course‖ (NP, 138). Even in the case of chronic disease, it first presents itself
to the living being as a critical event, or rupture, before it becomes chronic, reorganizing
life into the time before and the time after the break. Once the illness loses its critical
character and stabilizes into a chronic condition, the past before the event of disease
continues to exist in the memory and experience of the patient, ―a past for which the
patient or those around [her] remain nostalgic‖ (NP, 138). According to Canguilhem, the
appearance of disease as a chronological event that occurs within the time of the
individual is a fundamental feature of the experience of disease. Emphasizing the
individual experience of disease as a temporal rupture, this description frames the relation
between sickness and health as intrinsic to the individual. While individuals identify
themselves as sick in relation to others who are healthy, crucially, for Canguilhem, ―we
are sick in relation not only to others but also to ourselves‖ (NP, 138). Since the patient
primarily defines her sickness in relation to her previous state of health, she is the one
best qualified to differentiate between the two states. The rupture caused by disease exists
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While there is a lower limit to normality, the lack of an upper limit attempts to lessen
the criticism that for physiology ―normal man [is] a mediocre man‖ (NP, 164). That is, by not
establishing a maximum for normality, physiology need not categorize individuals who surpass
the norm in the positive direction as abnormal.
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within her conscious awareness. She experiences disease as an interruption, preventing
her from continuing her past actions. Thus, the return to normality is equivalent to an
overcoming of this interruption, allowing the patient to resume her previous actions.
According to Canguilhem, it is this quest for temporal continuity that forces the
physician to leave the judgment of normality to the patient: ―For a man whose future is
almost always imagined starting from past experience, becoming normal again means
taking up an interrupted activity or at least an activity deemed equivalent by individual
tastes or the social values of the milieu‖ (NP, 119). For the individual to consider herself
once again normal, the return to the interrupted activity need not be identical in all
respects. The devastating experience of disease as rupture renders the individual more
willing to classify herself as normal even if her new norms do not equal the old. Since the
patient ―almost died‖ and ―had a narrow escape,‖ she likely will count the return to her
past activity as a return to life and normality even if her capacity to perform that activity
has significantly decreased (NP, 119). For example, Canguilhem discusses a patient who
while working cut his arm upon a circular saw. After his operation, the patient is pleased
to learn ―there is the possibility he will recover much of the use of his limb,‖ allowing
him to return to work (NP, 120). Even though the arm will never return to the previous
norm or equal his uninjured arm in strength, range of motion, or flexibility, his ability to
return to his previous action is sufficient to count as a return to normality. Despite his
injury, he will continue to be evaluated and ―appreciated according to former norms‖
(NP, 120). In both his eyes and those who knew him before, he will always be ―a
cartwright or driver and not a former cartwright or former driver‖ (NP, 120). Thus, in the
case of disease, the patient determines when he has reestablished the continuity of action
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ruptured by the event of disease; that is, the patient, and not the physician, decides when
his individual norms have been restored.
Although the patient‘s assessment of her individual norms usually trumps any
objective criterion of normality, if her opinion falls outside the view of her social milieu,
then the physician will likely elect to intercede. According to Canguilhem, ―it is the
patients who most often decide … whether they are no longer normal or whether they
have returned to normal‖ (NP, 119; emphasis added). However, they do not always
decide. For example, Gustave Flaubert‘s fictional physician, Bovary, and Homais, the
pharmacist acting as his accomplice, convince Hippolyte, the stable boy with the
clubfoot, that his deformity is ―ugly,‖ ―hurts [him] terribly,‖ and prevents him from
carrying out the functions necessary to his livelihood.25 In other words, they redescribe
what he considers normal as pathological and in need of a cure. When Bovary botches the
procedure and a renowned surgeon must be called to amputate the boy‘s leg, he chastises
Bovary and Homais for foisting their conceptions of health and disease on the boy: ―We
practice medicine, we cure, and we never think about operating on someone who‘s
perfectly healthy! Straighten a clubfoot indeed! Is it possible to straighten a clubfoot? It‘s
like wanting to make a hunchback straight!‖ 26 The response of this famous surgeon
indicates that the norms of that nineteenth-century rural French town admit a clubfoot as
normal and ―perfectly healthy.‖ By subverting the boy‘s assessment of his condition and
convincing him it is abnormal, the doctor and pharmacist overstep their bounds. Since the
stable boy has always been able to perform the functions necessary for his work and
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Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary, trans. Mildred Marmur (New York: New American
Library, 1964), 174.
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Ibid., 180.
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wellbeing, he has always been both healthy and normal with respect to himself.
Ironically, the botched surgery itself becomes the break in continuity for the boy that he
must overcome in order for him to return to normality. As the one who experiences and
lives through disease, the patient, according to Canguilhem, must be allowed to
determine whether or not the therapeutic intervention of the physician restores him to his
past state and reestablishes his previous individual norms.

1.3.3 Relativism of Norms
As judgments of vital value, biological norms are not absolute facts. According to
Canguilhem, no fact is normal in itself. Rather, a fact can only be deemed normal in
relation to its conditions. To call a function, a behavior, or a particular morphology
normal is to express a relation between these biological facts and their environment.
Likewise, an environment is normal only insofar as it is the environment in which a
particular living organism ―lives out its life better‖ or ―maintains its own norm better‖
(NP, 142). Thus, the relativist aspect of the designation ‗normal‘ holds for both the
organism or function and the environment or conditions. Noting this relativity of norms,
Canguilhem asserts that even the pathological fact—an aberration or a mutation—is not
pathological in itself. The pathological is not the negation of all biological normativity.
Rather, it is merely a different norm, albeit a norm less suited to its current environment,
a norm ―comparatively speaking, pushed aside by life‖ (NP, 144). However, for most
norms, nothing precludes the possibility of the fact deemed pathological in relation to its
current environment from becoming normal in relation to a different environment. The
ongoing process of evolution, which alters the interplay between the living being and the
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environment, indeed, often begins in a mutation or alteration which could be deemed
pathological. Despite this relativity of norms and the normative character of both the
normal and the pathological, according to Canguilhem, it is still possible to establish a
hierarchy of human biological norms via reference to the ―normal human ideal‖ (NP,
139). This section traces the relativist aspects Canguilhem highlights in his exposition of
the biological concepts of norm and normal. In particular, it focuses on the development
and interrelation of three features: (1) the relational aspect between the normal biological
fact and its environment, (2) the normative character of the pathological fact, and (3) the
ability to hierarchize the multiplicity of normal and pathological biological norms.
***
In his discussion of evolution, Canguilhem elucidates the relationship between the
normal biological fact and the environment. He claims the normal and the pathological
are not invariant facts, but rather are life‘s judgment of vital value. In this sense, the
normal and the pathological need have no particular frequency. That is to say, the normal
is not necessarily the most prevalent and the pathological the least. Instead, the normal
corresponds to a positive vital value and the pathological to a negative vital value.
Neither absolute nor abstract, these value judgments of life always stand in relation to the
life of a particular organism and its environment. A study of Drosophila with vestigial
wings is a case in point. In a closed environment, the flies with normal wings outcompete
those with vestigial wings. However, in an open environment, the study found
Drosophila with the mutation to account for 60 percent of the population in just three
generations, since these flies feed and mate constantly. The morphology of the
Drosophila with vestigial wings thus makes them better suited to the open environment
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whereas the so-called normal Drosophila thrive better in their usual, closed environment
(NP, 142). Since the stability of an environment is never guaranteed, Canguilhem avoids
labeling the closed environment the normal one for Drosophila. According to
Canguilhem,
an environment is normal because a living being lives out its life better there,
maintains its own norm better there. An environment can be called normal with
reference to the living species using it to its advantage. It is normal only in terms
of a morphological and functional norm. (NP, 142)
No so-called normal fact—for instance, functional wings in Drosophila—is absolutely
normal but instead always depends upon the vital value accorded to it in regard to a
specific set of conditions. Functional wings in an open seashore environment would not
be normal, since it would confer a negative vital value upon the organism. The selective
advantage of the heterozygote for sickle cell in certain parts of sub-Saharan Africa where
malaria is prevalent offers an example on the human level. While the heterozygote has a
decreased capacity to transport oxygen through the blood, in an environment where
malaria is common, this individual has a selective advantage over the homozygote
dominant (i.e., the ‗normal‘), since the slight defect in hemoglobin structure confers
resistance to malaria. Thus, in that particular environment, the heterozygote is an
adaptation of life that allows the individual to live out its life better. In other words, this
mutation in protein structure carries a positive vital value, making the individual ―more
fit to survive‖ (NP, 265). But again, the designation ‗normal‘ only applies to the
heterozygote in that particular environment. Since the parasite cannot complete its
lifecycle in colder climes, the heterozygote gains no positive vital value in these
environments. What constitutes the normal in sub-Saharan Africa is not normal in North
America where the decreased capacity for oxygen transport might have a negative vital
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value. As both these examples demonstrate, ―there is no fact which is normal or
pathological in itself‖ (NP, 144). Intrinsic to the concept normal is a relation between life
and its environment.
***
Norms are not exclusive to the domain of the normal, but exist within the
pathological as well. Whether deemed normal or pathological in relation to its
environment, life is always governed by norms. Thus, the presence or absence of norms
cannot mark the break between the normal and the pathological. This fact lends the study
of biological norms and the normal an ambiguous quality. One cannot point to the mere
fact of a biological norm and claim it is normal in the normative sense because life also
admits of pathological norms. This normative character of life in both disease and health
is of fundamental importance for Canguilhem. He claims that the normative character of
the normal being is, in fact, the being‘s ability to establish new norms. When confronted
with an environmental change, a pathogenic agent, or an internal disturbance, the normal
living being, insofar as it is normal, has the capacity to overcome this breach of its norms
and institute news ones. Critically, for Canguilhem‘s analysis, the new norms established
by the organism are never equivalent to the old. Even if the living being perceives itself
as recovering from having ―almost died‖ and returning to normal, the normal reached
after the event of sickness is fundamentally new. The omnipresence of norms and the
normative character of life itself confer a relativist aspect upon the study of disease.
Under Canguilhem‘s conception of disease, the biological norms before and after
the onset of disease are different, whether the living being conceives herself to have been
cured or to have entered a chronic state of sickness. Unlike the positivist account of
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disease, Canguilhem‘s theory does not maintain sickness as a mere quantitative variation
of the normal physiological state. Instead, he claims, ―Disease is not a variation on the
dimension of health; it is a new dimension of life‖ (NP, 186). Even though therapeutic
intervention or the body‘s natural response may restore the living being to its previous
function, it represents a new path to the same outcome. According to Canguilhem,
disease is not a regression to a simpler state. That is, disease is neither a ―loss of what one
had possessed‖ nor is it a slippage on the sliding scale of health (NP, 188). Rather,
according to Canguilhem, disease is both ―deprivation and change,‖ both negative and
positive (NP, 186; emphasis added). Although the biological norms reestablished by the
life of the living being may allow it to resume its interrupted function, the new norms are
precisely that—new: ―Disease is a new life, characterized by new physiological constants
and new mechanisms for obtaining apparently unchanged results‖ (NP, 188). Describing
disease as nothing but an absence, a loss, that is, something strictly negative, one misses
the directionality of disease. If disease were merely a regression, then comparisons
between the adult unable to speak as a result of a neurological disease and the
prelinguistic child would be legitimate. However, according to Canguilhem, this sort of
comparison is an ―absurdity,‖ since it ignores the normative direction of each individual
(NP, 189). The normal impetus of development of the child pushes it to achieve new
norms and acquire language whereas the sick adult no longer has the normative power to
develop new norms and merely strives to maintain those norms of life ―within which he
feels almost normal, that is, in a position to use and dominate his own environment‖ (NP,
189). For the sick adult, the disease results in a loss of normativity (i.e., a loss of the
possibility to establish new norms). The possible situations in which he can feel equal to
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the demands of his task have constricted. Thus, the relation of the norm to possible future
situation determines the degree of normativity; that is, the norm must always be evaluated
in terms of the future to come.
The pathological fact is normal in relation to its specific situation, but it is
pathological insofar as it does not admit the possibility of a new norm. It is not the lack of
a norm that makes a being sick, but rather it is its ―incapacity to be normative‖ (NP, 186).
A norm is pathological for Canguilhem insofar as it does not admit the establishment of
any new norms. The superfluity of norms—both pathological and normal—complicates
the positivist account of disease as a change in intensity. Canguilhem‘s insight is thus his
recognition that norms govern all life, whether normal or pathological, and this fact gives
the relationship between the normal and the pathological, or health and sickness, a
relativist character, since the assessment of all norms turns upon their relation to the
possible future situation.
***
Even though no fact is normal in itself and no life is without norms, Canguilhem
contends it is still possible to maintain a meaningful distinction between the normal and
the pathological. An absolute distinction between the normal and pathological marked by
the presence or absence of norms is impossible, yet this fact does not lead to a radical
relativism of norms. All biological norms are not equal. In fact, biological norms form a
hierarchy according to their own normativity, that is, according to their ability to
establish new norms. The ―normal human ideal‖ sets the standard by which all other
biological norms can be evaluated (NP, 139). This paradoxical formulation—normal
ideal—signifies the state of health in which the living being can adapt to every possible
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future condition. In this state, no change in either the external or internal environment
would bring about the end of life to the living being. Instead, the ideally normal being
would successfully adapt to the change and establish new norms, thereby enabling its
continued existence. As an ideal, this formulation is little more than a fantasy, but it
serves to illustrate Canguilhem‘s point: biological norms can be ranked based upon their
flexibility to adapt to new conditions of life. While both health and disease have
corresponding norms of life, the former has more flexibility, allowing it to continue
through greater deviations whereas the latter has a more restricted set of possible
conditions in which it can continue to thrive.
The pathological state is inferior to the normal state not because it lacks all norms,
but rather because its norms of life are rigid. While the conditions remain constant, the
pathological norms function adequately, allowing the living human being to see herself as
equal to her situation and tasks. In fact, according to Canguilhem, this self-perception of
the individual is not a false or incomplete consciousness—in those given conditions she
is, indeed, normal. Only when the situation changes does she become aware of her
inability to reestablish new norms. Thus, only then does she experience herself in her
conscious awareness as sick or abnormal. For example, Canguilhem describes a
housekeeper who finds herself normal in relation to the given conditions of her work. She
is equal to the task of caring for the children and tending to the house. She becomes
aware of her hypotension only when she vacations in the mountains, since the decrease in
pressure at high altitudes causes her blood pressure to drop to the point where she begins
to experience neurovegetative disturbances. Since the housekeeper does not live in the
mountains and need not vacation there again, she remains normal in relation to her
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normal situation upon her return home. However, according to Canguilhem, this example
illustrates the hierarchy of norms: ―Of course, no one is obliged to live at high altitudes.
But one is superior if one can do it, for this can become inevitable at any time. A norm of
life is superior to another norm when it includes what the latter permits and what it
forbids‖ (NP, 182). The woman‘s hypotension restricts the possible situations in which
she could live in a normative relation to her environment. Thus, in this regard, her norm
of life is inferior to someone with normal blood pressure. Nevertheless, in her current
situation, she is perfectly normal. Likewise, the colorblind individual is normal, and equal
to her task, until she determines she wants to become a pilot or an artist. So long as she is
a copy editor or a plumber, her vision is normal, since she is equal to her tasks and her
situation. The norms of life for these pathological or abnormal cases are normal for their
particular situations, yet they do not admit of variation. The rigidity of pathological
norms allows them to maintain their normative character only insofar as the situation
remains static.
The recourse to the notion of a normal human ideal functions to mediate between
the subjective and objective perspectives within Canguilhem‘s account. In a sense, it
affords him a middle way between the utterly objective and utterly subjective
perspectives. His theory rehabilitates the sick being‘s point of view but can still account
for the preference for certain norms. By softening the break between the normal and the
pathological (for him, it is no longer a question of presence and absence of norms, since
both states are governed by norms), he grants the sick being normal life under certain
conditions, but he also upholds a hierarchy of norms, allowing for an objective distinction
between norms that are more and less favorable for certain kinds of life. Nevertheless, at
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its foundation, Canguilhem‘s theory rests upon the subjective. By depicting the normal
not as an absolute fact, but as a flexible norm, Canguilhem does not slip back into the
positivist account of disease, which maintains a ―continuity between the normal and the
pathological in essence save for quantitative variations‖ (NP, 182). Instead, this
borderline, although ―imprecise‖ at the level of the population or species, is ―perfectly
precise‖ at the concrete level of the individual (NP, 182). From her subjective
perspective, the individual arbitrates this distinction for herself. She experiences this
qualitative transformation at ―the very moment‖ when she ―feels inferior to the tasks
which the new situation imposes‖ upon her (NP, 182). In this way, Canguilhem
establishes the fundamental role of the subjective perspective in the recognition of
disease. By contrast, his hierarchy of norms highlights the objective character of disease
as experienced by the living being, thus preventing the distinction between disease and
health from falling into the obscurity of radical relativism. In one sense, a state of disease
is normative in that it is governed by norms, but it is not, in another sense, because it is
unable to establish new norms. Thus, disease ranks below health on the scale set forth by
the normal human ideal. According to Canguilhem,
[d]isease is still a norm of life but it is an inferior norm in the sense that it
tolerates no deviation from the conditions in which it is valid, incapable as it is of
changing itself into another norm. The sick living being is normalized in welldefined conditions of existence and has lost its normative capacity, the capacity to
establish other norms in other conditions. (NP, 183)
This conception of disease finds the middle ground between the absolutism of objectivity
and the relativism of the subjective perspective. On the one hand, Canguilhem upholds
both the relative character of the norm in relation to the situation of the living being and
in relation to the pathological norm; he thus preserves disease as it is experienced by the
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living being. On the other hand, this relativity inherent in the subjective perspective does
not establish all norms as equal, a fact contrary to the concrete experience of the living
being. Canguilhem understands we evaluate biological norms by their normative
capacity: ―Normal man is normative man, the being capable of establishing new, even
organic norms‖ (NP, 139). Thus, a biological norm is more normal and more highly
valued by the living being the greater its normative power, its ability to renormalize itself
in any future condition imposed upon it. Oriented toward the future, biological norms
receive their relative value based upon how well they can transform themselves to remain
normal in future situations. A norm is more normal, healthier, and more highly regarded
the more flexible it is—the more it can adapt to its horizon of possibilities. As
Canguilhem notes, health ranks in value over disease and the normal over the
pathological in the eyes of the living being (and by life itself), since healthy or normal
norms can withstand via adapting to both the expected and the unexpected.
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CHAPTER 2
FOUCAULT: THE EXPOSITION OF CERTAIN CONCEPTS

2.1 The Time and Space of Disease: Conceptions of Disease from Classificatory to
Clinical Medicine
In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault offers an account of the shift in the theoretical
configuration of disease in the latter half of the eighteenth century. This section follows
his analysis of this mutation in medical perception and experience. Traversing a span of a
little over fifty years, this account begins with the eighteenth-century classificatory
configuration of the ideal disease. From this classificatory ideal disease, it passes through
the historical emergence of the proto-clinic, which gave rise to the formulation of the
statistical disease, before terminating in the anatomo-pathological medicine marked by
Bichat in the nineteenth century. Foucault‘s historical analysis of the rupture in medical
knowledge that radically cleaves the projects of classificatory medicine from those of
anatamo-physiological medicine in the span of a few short years illuminates the historical
aspect of even our most cherished medical and scientific systems of knowledge. The
exposition of these historical configurations of disease offer alternatives to our current
medical and scientific theories of disease and, in addition, highlights the fact that our
modern conceptions of disease are also historical and, therefore, transitory.
***
During the eighteenth century, the classificatory method provided the framework
for the recognition, understanding, and treatment of disease. Classificatory medicine‘s
modus operandi first required the construction of a table of diseases based upon the
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interrelations between the different disease classes, or species. To construct a table of
diseases, each disease requires a unique essence. From these essences, eighteenth-century
nosology arranged the disease on the table via analogy and resemblance. For instance,
classificatory nosologists perceived a fundamental resemblance among all diseases
characterized by discharge. Thus, catarrh and dysentery belong to the same disease
family, since they are linked via analogy: ―what catarrh is to the throat, dysentery is to the
intestines‖ (BC, 5). From these pathological essences classificatory medicine discerned
an inherent orderability within diseases. The essences of disease presented themselves to
the classificatory gaze which then perceived their essential resemblances. From this
medical perception, eighteenth-century nosographers situated each disease in its proper
place on the invariant table of hierarchal ―families, genera, and species‖ (BC, 4). This
table of diseases, once properly constructed, affords a ―picture‖ that reveals to the
physician the inherent connections between different diseases and the proper treatments
necessary to each (BC, 4). That is, it serves both to organize all pathological knowledge
and to provide the impetus for effective therapeutic intervention. According to Foucault,
the condition of possibility for this tabular organization of knowledge in the eighteenth
century is the ontological conception of the ―being of disease‖ (BC, 189), that is, the
positing of a pathological essence, and this conception of disease creates a multiplicity of
effects in classificatory medicine‘s theoretical understanding and clinical perception of
disease.
First and foremost, this configuration of disease and the construction of a
nosological table establish the primacy of the historical knowledge of disease.
Classificatory medicine does not concern itself with the philosophical knowledge of
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disease; it is not interested in the ―origin, the principle, the causes of disease‖ for their
own sake and in their own right (BC, 5). It only concerns itself with these philosophical
concepts insofar as they are also historical, that is, insofar as they are accessible to the
medical gaze. Under this configuration, the condition of possibility for knowledge of
disease is the accessibility of the pathological fact—that is, the candidate for
knowledge—to the medical gaze. In other words, classificatory medicine seeks the
history of pathological phenomena discernable by the direct observation of the medical
gaze, or what Foucault terms ―historical knowledge‖ (BC, 5). What differentiates
philosophical from historical knowledge of disease is the ability of the gaze to grasp the
latter. Any fact of disease that exposes itself to the gaze—for instance, ―a cause that can
be seen, a symptom that is gradually discovered, a principle that can be deciphered from
its root‖ (BC, 5)—is a candidate for pathological knowledge. This is the simplest
knowledge and thus ―must precede all others‖ as the ―original form of medical
experience‖ (BC, 6). This focus on the simple and perceptible facts available to the
medical gaze creates as a condition for knowledge the possibility of the placement of the
pathological fact on the nosological table.
Identifying and classifying species of disease, eighteenth-century pathology
conceives of its task in the same vein as the work of the natural historians in biology and
botany, since all of them aim to arrange the different species and classes onto a table of
knowledge. In fact, the English physician Thomas Sydenham draws a direct parallel
between the study of plant and animal species and disease species. According to him, the
species of the plant and animal kingdoms confirm that each disease also has its own
species. He claims the author of nature is bound by equally certain laws for ―producing
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diseases‖ as for ―growing plants and animals.‖ 1 Propping the study of diseases upon the
stable foundation already established by the classification of living organisms, he
continues his argument from analogy:
He who observes attentively the order, the time, the hour at which the attack of
quart fever begins, the phenomena of shivering, of heat, in a word all the
symptoms proper to it, will have as many reasons to believe that this disease is a
species as he has to believe that a plant constitutes a species because it grows,
flowers, and dies always in the same way. 2
From this botanical model, Sydenham seeks to establish the rational order of diseases as
flowing directly from the essence of disease. Disease, as an ontologically distinct being,
has a unique essence that always follows the same rational order. Just as the regular
development of a plant from a seed to a sprout to a bud to a flower reveals its essential
nature, so too does the progression and development of disease. The ideality of disease—
its species essence—necessitates the regularity of this process and allows for no
deviations. Invoking the analogy to plants, this botanical model suggests ―the rationality
of life is identical with the rationality of that which threatens it‖ (BC, 7). Both the
processes of life and disease follow the same invariant laws of nature.
This ideality of disease captured by the table of knowledge does not admit a
temporality of disease independent from its ideal nature or essence. According to
eighteenth-century nosology, the temporal aspect of disease progression available to the
medical gaze is an epiphenomenon of the ontological ordering of the disease, a mere
replication or ―‗carbon copy‘ of the world of life‖ (BC, 7). The medical gaze collects and
catalogs these pathological phenomena that seem to occur in time, not to elucidate the
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philosophical question of cause and effect, but rather to ―communicate with the
ontological order‖ of the disease (BC, 7). According to Foucault, the gaze that scans the
body does not differentiate temporally between cause and effect: ―an effect has the same
status as its cause, the antecedent coincides with what follows it‖ (BC, 6). In this way, the
classificatory table abolishes time in its ―flat surface of perpetual simultaneity‖ (BC, 6).
What seems to unfold in time is, in fact, always already included within the nosological
table, within the essence of the disease. The inflammation from a muscle sprain or the
mucosal secretions from catarrh are not perceived causally. Indeed, they are not
fundamentally in time. The apparent progression of disease derives solely from the
ontological order of the ideal disease. On the nosological table of knowledge, the
respiratory inflammation and mucosal secretions of catarrh occur not at the level of cause
and effect but at the more fundamental level of the ontological order of disease. At this
level, the level of all nosological knowledge, the ideal, ontological order ―organizes from
the inside, prior to all manifestation‖ (BC, 7). The ideality of disease, arranged in a table
of analogies and resemblances, supersedes any chronological or temporal progression of
disease. According to Foucault, eighteenth-century pathology tracked the time of disease,
but only because it revealed ―part of the essential structure of disease‖ (BC, 12). By itself,
time never introduces its own events or deviations in the course of disease. The ideal and
essential nature of the disease already contains time. It is not a variable, which when
introduced modifies the course of the disease:
There is no process of evolution in which duration introduces new events of itself
and at its own insistence; time is integrated as a nosological constant, not as an
organic variable. The time of the body does not affect, and still less determines,
the time of the disease. (BC, 12)
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In fact, the time of disease is pre-established in Leibnizian fashion by the ‗author of
nature‘. Just as he established the laws of physics, God ―fixed the course of most diseases
through immutable laws‖ (BC, 14). Thus, the progression of disease is predetermined and
invariant. The unfolding of the disease in time is merely the completion of its essence,
leading the disease to its necessary and immutable fulfillment as set out in the nosological
table.
This primary configuration of disease into classes, or species, in the eighteenth
century structures diseases as both ideal and natural. Although classificatory medicine‘s
nosological table captures the ideality of disease, the medical gaze never encounters this
pure form of disease in nature. Nevertheless, diseases are natural because they ―state their
essential truths‖ (BC, 8). As it appears in nature, the essential, ideal character of disease
is never ―unchanged and undisturbed‖ (BC, 8). That is, the essence of disease can never
reveal itself in its purity because it always manifests within the patient‘s body, which
partially veils the essence from the medical gaze (BC, 8). In Aristotelian fashion, the
body acts as an accidental cause. It is never included within the pure essence of the
disease. For the doctor attempting to identify and classify the disease species, the
patient‘s body obscures the essential nature of the disease. All the extraneous
characteristics of the patient—―his predispositions, his age, his way of life‖—are
accidents added to the ―essential nucleus‖ of the disease (BC, 8). The individual patient is
a ―negative element, the accident of the disease‖ (BC, 14). Thus, in order for the medical
gaze to perceive the unadulterated essence of the disease, it must excise everything
nonessential. In other words, to reach the pure form of the ideal disease, the physician
must subtract the contribution of the dispositions and proclivities of patient‘s body from
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the constellation of symptoms. By bracketing the patient in this manner, the physician
can discern the essential symptoms and the ideal form of the disease. Since both life and
disease follow the laws of nature and develop according to their essences, disease is not
the antithesis of life, but rather the patient is the antithesis of disease: ―It is not the
pathological that functions, in relation to life, as counter-nature, but the patient in relation
to the disease itself‖ (BC, 8). In itself, the disease is both natural and ideal, the perfect
instantiation and fulfillment of its essence.
If the mere addition of the patient‘s body can alter the appearance of the disease
to the medical gaze, the imprudent actions of the physician can obscure the pure form of
disease beyond recognition. The ideality of the disease ensures that it will progress in the
manner natural to its essence if left to itself. Disease progression is predetermined by the
essence and slowly but surely reveals itself to the medical gaze. However, any
intervention of the doctor not aligned with the ―ideal ordering of nosology‖ constitutes an
―act of violence‖ against the disease (BC, 8). Since the disease is not contrary to life, this
violence serves no beneficial or therapeutic purpose. In fact, it is deleterious to the aims
of medicine because it renders the goal of classificatory medicine, i.e., the designation of
disease, impossible. A ―remedy administered too early‖ thwarts the natural progress of
the disease and ―prevents the disease from acceding to its true nature,‖ thereby making
the disease unnatural and untreatable (BC, 8). To avoid modifying the essential nature of
disease into something bastard and incurable, the physician ―must hold his breath‖ and
wait for the disease to ―reveal its class, its genus, and its species.‖ 3 She should content
herself with lessening the pain of the patient and observing the natural, ideal progression
3
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of the disease. 4 Rather than blocking or diverting the progress of disease, the physician
must first observe in order to classify and then assist the disease in reaching its natural,
preordained telos.
In the classificatory medicine of the eighteenth century, the ideality of disease
insists disease itself is the rightful commander of its fate. It is equipped with an essential
nature that impels it forward toward its necessary end. Neither the patient nor the doctor
should stand in its way, since the progression of disease belongs to the natural and
rational order of things. Under this conception, the ultimate goal of medicine is its own
self-effacement. Because of the ―disturbance‖ introduced by the patient and the doctor
―can hardly be avoided,‖ medicine settles for the next best thing: the minimization and
neutralization of these effects (BC, 9). Thus, it attempts to abstract both the effects of the
patient and the doctor from the effects of the disease. By heightening the differences
between the true effects of the disease and the mere artifacts of the patient and doctor,
classificatory medicine hopes to discern the ―ideal configuration of the disease‖ in the
―concrete, free form, totalized at last in a motionless, simultaneous picture‖ (BC, 9).
Medicine built upon this nosological table must not interfere with the progress of disease,
but rather must stand back as the essence of disease revels itself in its ideal spatiality.
While the complications of the patient and the doctor are unavoidable and thus
tolerated by classificatory medicine, the hospital, with its medical apparatuses and
therapeutic interventions, is a flagrant violation of the essence of disease. In the hospital
4
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environment, no disease could exist with its essence intact. Everything about the hospital
is artificial, and, according to eighteenth-century classificatory medicine, it stands
opposed to the natural essence of disease in every way. The recognition of disease
species by the doctor becomes nearly impossible in the hospital because the ―transplanted
disease runs the risk of losing its essential identity‖ (BC, 17). In this ―unkempt garden‖
of disease, species crossbreed, thus altering the ―natural course of the disease‖ and
making it ―more difficult to decipher‖ (BC, 17). With the proliferating effects of the
hospital denigrating the natural essence of disease, it is no wonder classificatory medicine
labeled these cesspools of disease ―temples of death‖ (BC, 17).
Since the eighteenth century configured disease as both natural and ideal, an
essential phenomenon with invariant laws, the natural place of disease was in the family.
The logic of this assertion is apparent. Because life and disease follow the same laws of
nature, what is natural for life is likewise natural for disease. The natural setting for life is
within the context of the family; therefore, the proper place for disease is also within the
family. In this setting, the disease has free reign to develop according to its predetermined
course. For both the patient and her disease, the loving family provides the ideal
backdrop since she avoids the despair of entering a ―temple of death‖ and her illness is
afforded the space and freedom ―to attain its own truth‖ without interference (BC, 17).
For the poor and those without families, the hospital was a necessary evil, but in general
situating illness within the natural environs of the family, free of ―artificial
complications,‖ was the proper course of action (BC, 39). According to this logic,
―disease would everywhere find its natural, or almost natural, locale where it would be
free to follow its own course‖ (BC, 40). When granted the freedom to accede to its ideal
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essence, the disease would naturally run its course and ―abolish itself in its truth,‖ thus
allowing the patient to return to health (BC, 40).
On the cusp of the nineteenth century, an epistemic break marked the end of
classificatory medicine and the reorganization of all medical knowledge. The
simultaneous table of disease lost its authority and the medical gaze shifted from the
nosological gaze, perceptive of essences, to an anatomo-clinical gaze that sought the
foundations of disease, not in pathological essences, but rather in the living being gone
awry. Foucault finds evidence for the emergence of the age of the clinic in what he calls
the proto-clinics of the end of the eighteenth century. Existing in the liminal position
between classificatory and clinical medicine, the proto-clinic overcame many of the
shortcomings of classificatory medicine but nevertheless retained the conception of an
ideal disease.
The primary goal of the clinic was the instruction and training of aspiring
physicians and surgeons. However, the focus on learning from practical experience was
not a new idea, for there was already in the eighteenth century ―very wide recognition of
the need for teaching through practice itself‖ (BC, 58). For Foucault, what accords these
clinics an integral place within the history of medicine is not the fact that they aimed to
teach via a practice but how they did so. As the eighteenth century saw, the hospital was a
breeding ground for disease, an artificial complication in the natural progression of ideal
diseases. How could the proto-clinic not fall prey to this same criticism? According to
Foucault, the arrangement of the clinic and the selection of ―cases‖ allow the disease to
maintain its ideality within the clinic. Patients, or, more properly, cases, were admitted to
the clinic for a particular purpose. The clinic could neither accept everyone nor be overly
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specialized, since the ensemble of cases gathered there had a quite specific aim—―to
manifest the complete circle of diseases‖ (BC, 59). In order for it to overcome the
problems of the hospital, the clinic must accept cases on the basis of pedagogic utility. It
must create a ―didactic totality of an ideal experience‖ representative of all diseases (BC,
59). Thus, even before a doctor met with a patient, the proto-clinic was a carefully
―structured nosological field‖ (BC, 59).
Although the ideal conception of disease was little altered by this restructuring of
the nosological field, the level of knowledge and truth shifted. Prior to the formation of
these proto-clinics, in the hospitals and in the homes of the ill, the doctor sought the
knowledge of disease at the level of the individual before her. She was summoned by the
family when one of its members ―happen[ed] to be suffering from one disease or
another,‖ and her task was to sort through the symptoms, separate the effects of the pure
disease from those of the patient, and classify the species (BC, 59). She had to look for
the truth of disease ―buried in the patient, concealed within him like a cryptogram‖ (BC,
59). By contrast, the proto-clinic established itself as a repository of ideal cases or
examples of disease. Here, the doctor does not encounter an individual who happens to be
suffering, but rather a disease ―that happen[s] to be afflicting this or that patient‖ (BC,
59). Truth in the proto-clinic was thus gleaned at the level of the totality in its ―synthetic
form‖ (BC, 59). The physician or students attended the patient‘s bedside with the chief
task of naming the disease from its visible manifestations. Like the ideal disease of the
eighteenth century, the ontological order of disease in the proto-clinic existed ―already
completed‖ and the perceptible symptoms were ―no more than its consequences‖ (BC,
59). Thus, an a priori relation between the essence of the ideal disease and its visible

60

manifestation provides the framework for the clinical gaze. What needs to be discerned
are these a priori ―relations set up between the phenomena observed‖ and the
―antecedents ascertained,‖ or in other words the ―ideal key‖ that would fully elucidate the
disease (BC, 60). However, the chief difference between the task of the hospital doctor or
family physician and the clinical student is the assurance the latter has that what she sees
is an uncorrupted, ideal type. By selecting only ideal cases that complete the ―circle of
diseases,‖ the shift in knowledge of disease to a higher synthetic plane negates the
disturbance caused by the patient‘s body (BC, 59). Whereas the hospital doctor
encounters disease in its bastard form, often altered beyond hope of identification, the
clinician deals only with ideal ―examples‖ of disease (BC, 59).
As before, the ideal structure of disease already incorporates time, but now,
within the proto-clinic, time takes on a pedagogic role. Disease in its pure form in the
proto-clinic invariably follows its fixed course, since there is nothing to disrupt it.
However, in this setting, time provides the ultimate confirmation or disconfirmation of
the designation of the disease. If, through her observations, the clinical student has failed
to grasp the ideal key and reach the proper designation of the disease, the inexorable
movement of time will reveal this failing. Time is the medium through which the truth of
disease speaks to the medical gaze. Since it is structured around diseases in their pure
form, the clinic allows for this test of time. This temporal test would have been
impossible in the unkempt garden of the hospital, since in that setting there are no
guarantees that the essence of disease will show itself through the disturbances caused by
both the body of the patient and the investigation of doctor. By contrast, the ideal setting
of the clinic allows nature to speak in the silence while the doctor and students observe.
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The reorganization of medicine around the clinic and the anatomo-clinical gaze
brought together two divergent themes of eighteenth-century medicine: the dramatic time
of disease and its invariant, ideal nature. For classificatory medicine, these two aspects of
disease, the dynamic and the atemporal, formed a ―double reality‖ (BC, 91). These two
aspects mapped directly onto the eighteenth century‘s conception of signs and symptoms.
On the one hand, the symptom, as the ―form in which the disease is presented,‖ has
ontological priority. It communes most closely with the essential nature of the disease: ―it
is the first transcription of the inaccessible nature of the disease‖ (BC, 90). Although the
constellations of symptoms never reveal the disease itself to the gaze, since it is
accessible only to reason, they nevertheless comprise the ―essential symptom‖ and ―make
it possible to designate a pathological state‖ (BC, 90). The sign, on the other hand, deals
with the dramatic time of the disease. It announces, points to, and indicates ―what will
happen‖ or ―what has happened‖ (BC, 90). Offering up no hidden truth, no essence of
disease, the sign adds nothing to the knowledge of disease but instead ―provides a basis
for recognition‖ (BC, 90). Inscribed in the temporal progression of disease, the sign
addresses itself to the outcome of disease and not its ―immobile truth‖ (BC, 91).
According to Foucault, the doublets of ‗dramatic time–sign‘ and ‗essential truth–
symptom‘ existed in eighteenth-century medicine as two separate and distinct systems.
Through the reorganization of medical knowledge in the age of clinic, the nineteenth
century dissolved the absolute distinction between the two and annulled their opposition.
This move to efface the radical distinction between the sign and the symptom—
the dramatic time and the ideal nature of disease—by nineteenth-century clinical
medicine was bound up with a greater change in the very language of disease. In the
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eighteenth century, signs and symptoms related to disease as signifier to signified. The
former indicated the latter without exhausting it. As Foucault points out in the preface,
this relation is identical to that between commentary and speech in which ―to comment is
to admit by definition an excess of the signified over the signifier.‖ 5 The signs and
symptoms can point to, indicate, and signal the disease as much and as often as they can,
but they still fail to reveal the disease in its essence. A surplus of the essence always
remains left over, as if hidden behind a veil, inaccessible to the signifier. Thus, the true
form of disease was never entirely accessible to the nosological gaze of classificatory
medicine. According to Foucault, nineteenth-century clinical medicine did away with this
signifier-signified structure of disease, and in so doing, it also did away with the essence
of disease. Thus, in the nineteenth century, the medical gaze achieved direct access to the
truth: finally, ―truth‖ was ―wholly given to the gaze‖ (BC, 91). By abolishing the essence
of disease, this restructuring of the conditions of medical knowledge exposed the disease
to the full light of day in utter transparency. Under this configuration of disease, the signs
and symptoms lose their distinctive character, for ―signs and symptoms are and say the
same thing‖ (BC, 93), and together they cease to merely signify the disease, but rather
they become the disease: ―the disease is simply a collection of symptoms‖ (BC, 92).
Thus, clinical medicine dissolves the tension between the dramatic time and the ideal
nature of disease:
The opposition between nature and time, between what is manifested and what
announces, has disappeared; the distinction between the essence of disease, its
symptoms and its signs, has also disappeared…. The medical field was no longer
to know these silent species; it was to open on to something which always speaks
a language that is at one in its existence and meaning with the gaze that deciphers
it—a language inseparably read and reading. (BC, 96)
5
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In this manner, the chronological time of disease progression and the ideality of disease,
which always includes this time in advance, come together before the nineteenth-century
gaze. For clinical medicine, the language of disease ceases to differentiate between the
gaze that reads the text of disease and the nature that both writes and speaks it—the world
and language are exactly superimposed.
In the eighteenth century, medicine recognized itself as an uncertain knowledge.
This admission of uncertainty, despite medicine‘s recourse to an ideal and invariant
configuration of disease, indicated both the complexity of its object (i.e., the human
being) and the imprecision of medicine itself, caused principally by the disconnect
between the signifier-signified structure, which forever prevented the medical gaze from
obtaining the essential nature of disease. However, with the dawning of the age of the
clinic in the nineteenth century and its reduction of the gap between the signifier and the
signified to the point of complete overlap, this uncertainty was transformed into a type of
statistical probability that converged upon certainty. Clinical medicine no longer looked
upon each patient as a sick person with a corrupted essential disease, completely distinct
from all others. Instead, it saw in the sick individual ―an endlessly reproducible
pathological fact to be found in all patients suffering in a similar way‖ (BC, 97). In this
manner, the multiplicity of observations of each patient represented a part of the whole.
When combined, the observation of a theoretically infinite number of patients formed a
convergent series. For nineteenth-century medicine, the physician did not need an ideal
key of disease by which to recognize and distinguish the essential disease from its
artificial complications. Rather, clinical medicine constructed the series of all the partial
facts, and the resulting synthesis gave the ideal disease. In other words, ―the general laws
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of nature‖ are to be discovered through ―studying‖ and analyzing ―the most frequent
phenomena.‖6 Whereas for the recognition of the pure form of disease in classificatory
medicine ―it was first necessary to possess it,‖ and from this pure essence to subtract out
the accidental features of actual experience, in the nineteenth century the accidental
features of disease ―separate of their own accord … because they are integrated into the
domain of probability‖ (BC, 102). That is, the statistical frequencies of the individual
pathological facts gathered from each patient combined to ―cancel each other out in the
general configuration‖ (BC, 102). This alteration in the configuration of medical
knowledge also had a rehabilitating effect on the institution of the hospital. Once
nineteenth-century medicine developed a method to obtain the ideal disease from the
statistical frequency, the practice of medicine no longer required that disease remain in a
natural environment:
As soon as medical knowledge is defined in terms of frequency, one no longer
needs a natural environment; what one now needs is a neutral domain, one that is
homogeneous in all its parts and in which comparison is possible and open to any
form of pathological event, with no principle of selection or exclusion. (BC, 109)
So long as there is no extraneous selection or variables, whatever the effects of the
hospital on disease, they will be ―rigorously annulled,‖ since the hospital will be a
constant across all the patients (BC, 109). In this manner, the clinical medicine of the
nineteenth century established a probabilistic knowledge, which no longer required a
priori access to an ideal key, since the ideal disease could be empirically derived from the
observed frequency of symptoms.
Through the work of Bichat, nineteenth-century medicine‘s clinical gaze
redirected its attention from the disease within life to the corpse in the repose of death.
6
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According to Foucault, this rediscovering of pathological anatomy by Bichat and his
followers reveals a fundamental reconfiguration of the movement of time within disease.
Foucault contends that pathological anatomy would never have been readmitted into the
clinic at the beginning of the nineteenth century unless the progression of disease were
inextricably linked to the progression of knowledge. While the knowledge of the living
disease was obscure and unintelligible, death brought clarity to this confusion. The
transparency and ―white visibility of the dead‖ served as the necessary lens to elucidate
the complex living disease (BC, 126). In this way, the development of medical
knowledge directly mirrors the progression of disease as captured in the anatomical gaze.
As disease tends toward death, the medical gaze ascends closer and closer to the truth of
disease, and in death, it finally reaches this ultimate goal. For Bichat, this linkage
between the forward movement of knowledge and disease is no accident. In fact,
according to him the coupled development arises from the very nature of disease itself.
That is, the essence of disease is analytic; it breaks down and separates the complex into
the simple. Thus, the analysis by the physician is merely a ―repetition in the doctor‘s
consciousness of the decomposition raging in the patient‘s body‖ (BC, 130). For
example, the pia mater and arachnoid, two of the membranes covering the brain and
spinal cord, are easily confused in life. However, the alteration caused by inflammation
easily separates and clarifies these two tissues, since the former ―reddens‖ and ―then
becomes harder and dryer‖ while the latter ―becomes whiter‖ (BC, 130). More than
providing a model for objective analysis, this analytic progress of disease is, for Bichat,
―an essential stage in the pathological process‖ (BC, 131). In this way, the disease speaks
its own truth to the anatomical gaze in death. For nineteenth-century pathological

66

anatomy, the essential nature of disease constantly propels it towards further
simplification and clarification to ultimately culminate in the illuminating white light of
death.
This new focus on pathological anatomy supplanted the chronological appearance
of symptoms with the localized lesion as the definitive sign of disease. Prior to the
nineteenth century, the nosological gaze was able to designate the disease from its impure
appearance in the patient because it already held the ideal key. At the cusp of the clinical
period, the physician no longer required this key in advance, since patients were
reconceived as part of a convergent series that cancelled out all anomalies to reveal the
pure form of the ideal disease. Of course, this configuration of the disease first required
the symptoms of many patients in order to recognize the disease in any given patient.
With the shift to pathological anatomy, this focus on cataloging and combining the
plurality of symptoms from all the different patients was no longer necessary. Under this
reconfiguration of disease, the anatomical gaze discovered a constant phenomenon. All
the visible symptoms with which it had previously concerned itself turned out to be
imprecise and uncertain. The convergent series now only seemed to capture a generic
disease, not the ideal disease. For instance, the observable symptoms of pulmonary
phthisis—that is, ―coughing, difficulty in breathing, marasmus, hectic fever‖—were not
the ―necessary and sufficient condition[s] for the presence of phthisis‖ (BC, 138). One
could encounter a patient lacking any (or all) of these symptoms who nevertheless had
phthisis, just as one could discover a patient with all these visible symptoms who was
later discovered not to have had this disease. For pathological anatomy, none of the
visible manifestations of a disease ―is absolutely indispensable‖ (BC, 138). Rather, the
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―one constant phenomenon‖ indicative of phthisis was the localizable lesion (BC, 138).
Without this lesion of the pulmonary parenchyma, discoverable only through autopsy,
there could be no phthisis.
From Bichat onwards, the gaze of pathological anatomy reigned supreme within
medicine. The presence or absence of a lesion—the ―localization of [this] fixed point‖—
determined the presence or absence of disease (BC, 138). The frequency of visible
symptoms apparent to the clinical gaze and the construction of the convergent series were
now only useful insofar as they pointed to the underlying site of disease. These symptoms
in the ―chronological series‖ became ―secondary phenomena‖ hovering over the fixed
point, the privileged site of disease (BC, 139). Henceforth, ―the succession of forms and
symptoms … appears simply as the chronological image of a more complex network: a
spatio-temporal proliferation spreading from an original attack throughout the organism‖
(BC, 139). Under this configuration, the observations of the clinical gaze could be
potentially useful since they could afford an indication of the disease in life. However,
they were not certain signs of disease, since they could ―slip and disappear‖ (BC, 138).
Only the gaze of pathological anatomy, with its privileged access to the corpse, could
once and for all discover the site of disease.
With this turn to pathological anatomy, medicine established new rules governing
disease progression. Whereas the eighteenth century conceived of the dramatic time of
disease as already contained in its essence, the nineteenth-century anatomical gaze
situated disease progression at the level of the local lesion. That is to say, through its
reconfiguration of the disease and its symptoms, the nineteenth century reversed the
relation, describing the origin and movement of disease from the fixed point in the

68

pathological anatomy. The progression of disease was no longer determined at the level
of the visible symptoms of the ideal disease and then played out in the body, but rather it
began at the fixed point of disease and continued by following the anatomical law of
tissual communication. According to Bichat, ―a pathological phenomenon follows in the
organism the privileged way prescribed by tissual identity‖ (BC, 149). That is, the
localized disease traverses along the tissues, ―follow[ing] a tissue horizontally, without
penetrating vertically into others‖ (BC, 150). Thus, the anatomy of the body, with its
layers of distinct tissues, predetermined the course of disease; the body itself proscribed
the only lines of continuity that the disease could follow. Just as ―organic vegetation‖
develops in the soil proper to it, so too the disease: it thrives only in the appropriate tissue
and flourishes and spreads throughout that tissue following law-like patterns of growth
(BC, 152). By situating disease within the life of the living being, nineteenth-century
pathological anatomy inscribes within the body the progression of disease: ―the
pathological course now has its obligatory ways‖ (BC, 150).
This inscription of disease within the body inserts death into life and establishes
disease for the first time not as negative and a metaphysical evil, but rather as something
with positive content. According to Foucault, disease becomes the link between life and
death in the nineteenth century. In one sense, death opposes life, but in another the two
are ―profoundly bound up‖ together (BC, 155). The concepts of degeneration and wear
illustrate this profound linkage between life and death for the anatomical gaze. The
degeneration of the living body is completely natural, governed by the same reversible
laws that led to its creation. In other words, this degeneration is neither random nor a
simple decline, since ―nature is constrained by constant laws in the destruction as in the

69

construction of beings.‖7 Disease and death, in this manner, are neither counter-nature
nor an accident of life, but rather they are essential to it. Although it ultimately ends in
death, the processes of degeneration are not counter to life: ―Degeneration lies at the very
principle of life, the necessity of death that is indissociably bound up with life, and the
most general possibility of disease‖ (BC, 158). As an essential temporal dimension of
organic activity, wear effects the gradual destruction of the tissue, organ, or body in the
very action that constitutes its life. For instance, the continual pumping of the heart
muscle is both a sign of life and of the death to come. Wear, that precursor to death,
creeps in and resides within the contractions of the heart that establish its life.
Nineteenth-century medicine, by crafting the trinity of life-disease-death, does away with
the conception of disease as a metaphysical, ideal presence hovering over the life of the
living being. The gaze of nineteenth-century pathological anatomy opens up onto the
death already inscribed in life.
Foucault‘s discussion in The Birth of the Clinic brings to light the mutation in
epistemic experience that led to this profound transformation in the knowledge available
to the medical gaze. Focusing on the rupture at the turn of the eighteenth century, he
highlights the reorganization of knowledge necessary for the profound reconfiguration of
disease—from the metaphysical and ideal pure disease of the eighteenth century to the
nineteenth-century conception of disease as a localized point fixed in anatomy. The
historical conceptions of disease he unearths serve to disturb the complacency with which
many think the modern medical and scientific practices and discourses of disease have
attained the light of truth to perceive the totality of the signified disease without the
distortion and limitation of the signifier. Like the relation between speech and
7
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commentary, his work suggests the concept of disease has not been exhausted but rather
points to a future open to new ways of thinking and rethinking.

2.2 From Condition to Being: The Formation of Recognizable Types of Being
According to Foucault‘s account in Abnormal, at the end of the nineteenth century
psychiatry discovered a concept which would allow the discipline to retain its newfound
authority without passing through the domain of medical illness—the condition. No
longer would psychiatry need to inscribe an individual‘s actions or behavior within a
pathological process in order to form the individual into possible object of study for
psychiatry. Through the configuration and deployment of the concept of the abnormal
condition, psychiatry bypasses organic medicine and its focus on sick individuals.
Instead, the discipline constitutes abnormal individuals who become the exclusive objects
of psychiatric knowledge. This concept takes the constellation of disparate and
amorphous signs and symptoms and transforms them into a stable type of being that can
then be measured against the opposing norm.
The following discussion of the condition begins with an exploration of the
historical formation and emergence of this concept and an analysis of its function within
psychiatry as presented by Foucault in Abnormal. It then turns to a consideration of two
types of being—the madman and the homosexual—both of which fit the general
characteristics of the abnormal condition. This section distills the crucial aspects of these
two conditions from Foucault‘s History of Madness and History of Sexuality,
respectively. Even though the configuration of madness in the eighteenth century
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predates the historical formation and elucidation of the condition, it nevertheless bears a
striking resemblance to the key features of the condition.
While the relevance of the historical emergence of the being of the homosexual
likely is obvious for this analysis of the contemporary emergence of AIDS and HIV, the
discussion of the madman may seem tangential. However, even on the surface, parallels
between the manifestation and recognition of the madman in the classical age and the
individual with AIDS at the turn of the century abound. For instance, each condition
presents primarily as a lack, despite the plenitude of signs and symptoms. In the
eighteenth-century configuration of madness, it is the lack of reason; in AIDS, it is the
lack of health or the generalized absence of the proper immune response. In addition, the
recognition of both madness in the classical age and AIDS in our own precedes any
theoretical knowledge. According to Foucault, the classical gaze recognized madness in
an immediate sense perception without detouring into the realm of theoretical knowledge.
Likewise, the condition of AIDS was perceptible to the trained medical gaze long before
any knowledge of the virus, HIV, was available. The many superficial linkages such as
these between the appearance and recognition of both the madman and the individual
with AIDS warrant a closer look at Foucault‘s account of the historical emergence and
development of madness.

2.2.1 The Condition
The theory of the condition emerged within psychiatric discourses in the latter
half of the nineteenth century as the discipline attempted to universalize its medical
power and expand the domain of the psychiatric gaze. While this transformation in
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psychiatry had diverse motivations and ramifications for the discipline, it also had a
profound effect on the configuration and perception of illness. Eschewing traditional
medicine‘s emphasis on precise chains of causality, this new psychiatry, organized
around the grand theory of the condition, sought to establish an indefinite yet stable
backdrop as the foundation of disease.8 Passed down through complex heredities and
often marking the physical body, the condition signified a new type of being. That is to
say, the theoretical development of the condition within psychiatric discourse caused
permanent, stable beings to appear before the gaze from within the amorphous
constellation of behaviors and actions of the individual.
Prior to the historical formation of these grand theories, psychiatry sought to
validate its medical authority through recourse to organic illness. An individual became a
possible object of psychiatry only if her behavior and actions could be inserted into a
pathological process. Thus, psychiatry searched for discontinuities in behavior that could
constitute the rupture between the normal state and the pathological. According to
Foucault, this ―medicine of mental alienation,‖ exemplified by the work of Esquirol,
modeled itself on traditional medicine. 9 In order to legitimately exercise medical power,
it first had to establish the objective relation between medicine and illness. For psychiatry
to function at the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was obliged to constitute the

8

Here, I am attempting to draw a distinction between the precise chains of causality that
operate within organic medicine (e.g., an etiologic agent causes infection, which causes an
immune response, which in turn causes swelling, etc.) and the background, generalized causality
established by the condition. The causality operating from this background condition is neither
linear nor fixed (i.e., the condition can act as a cause for a complex network of effects, but the
presence of the condition need not have any particular effect).
9

Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975, trans.
Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2003), 309 (hereafter cited in text as A).
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individual as ―ill for a knowledge that will then authorize [the psychiatrist] to function as
medical power‖ (A, 309).
Foucault cites the 1826 Henriette Cornier case as the example par excellence of
this deployment of psychiatry.10 In this case, Cornier, a young woman who was
abandoned by her husband and abandoned her children in turn, found work as a domestic
servant in Paris. She was given to bouts of sadness and often threatened to commit
suicide. One day she offered to care for her neighbor‘s infant. Upon securing the
neighbor‘s assent, Cornier took the child to her room and cleaved the child‘s head from
its body with a large knife she had placed in her room in advance. When questioned why
she had committed the act, she replied, ―Why? An idea.‖ 11 Incomprehensible to doctors,
the case was handed over to the psychiatric authority. According to Foucault, the absence
of motive in this case ―function[s] as the cornerstone for psychiatric intervention‖ (A,
113). In order for early nineteenth-century psychiatry to attribute the act to madness or
mental illness, it had to demonstrate a rupture in Cornier‘s behavior and to situate this
rupture as the onset of the pathological process. In other words, the psychiatrists who
examined Cornier needed to establish the discontinuity in her behavior in order to
consider her mentally ill:
One tried to inscribe Henriette Cornier‘s decapitation of a child within an illness
that was naturally very difficult to see but whose signs a practiced eye at least
could detect. And this was how, not without difficulty and much subtlety, one
came to refer all this back to a change of mood that affected Henriette Cornier at a
certain time of her life and marked the insidious invasion of this illness that
remained practically without symptom except the crime, but which was already
signaled by this little crack in her mood. (A, 297)

10

See A, 112.

11

H. Cornier in Ch. H. Marc, De la folie, vol. 2, 84 and 114, quoted at A, 112.
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The transformation in her mood marks the break between her and her childhood. In fact,
according to Foucault, Cornier was ―radically separated from childhood in two ways‖:
first, the morose adult she had become bore no resemblance to her carefree childhood,
and second, she had no link whatsoever to the child she decapitated (A, 303). This focus
on discontinuity reveals early nineteenth-century psychiatry‘s dependence upon the
traditional pathological model. That is, it followed traditional medicine‘s emphasis on the
chronological process of disease and the event of illness itself. The psychiatrists in the
case considered the change in Cornier to be ―monstrous, sick, and pathological in itself,‖
something that ―nothing can justify except, precisely, a pathological basis‖ (A, 297).
With the shift in psychiatry in the second half of the nineteenth century, the
theories of the condition supplanted the appeals to the pathological model. Instead of
inserting the offense in question into a chronological pathological process, psychiatry
situated it ―within a schema of permanent and stable stigmata‖ (A, 298). The mental
illness no longer presented in time like any other, but rather it pervaded the entire being.
That is to say, where previously psychiatry saw a person afflicted with mental illness, by
the end of the nineteenth century the psychiatric gaze met with individuals fixed within a
―condition of abnormality‖ (A, 307). The reification of amorphous signs and symptoms
into these stable conditions of abnormality led to the constitution of new types of being,
which then appeared before the psychiatric gaze. There was a complete coincidence
between the mental illness and the individual; the illness, be it homosexuality,
exhibitionism, or kleptomania, was no longer a disease with an identifiable onset, fixed
progression, and recognizable symptomatology. Instead, the behaviors and actions that
constituted these conditions coalesced around the individual to produce new types of
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being: the homosexual, the exhibitionist, and the kleptomaniac. In this way, the fixed
condition had the effect of ontologizing and codifying various ―eccentricities into wellspecified, autonomous, and recognizable syndromes‖ (A, 310).12
The theoretical framework of the condition reconfigured the entire domain of
psychiatry and the people who were considered its valid objects. With the development of
these theories, psychiatry was no longer beholden to the pathological model of illness.
According to Foucault, from roughly 1865-1870 this transformation of psychiatry caused
the abnormal individual to ―emerge in psychiatry … and populate it until the end of the
nineteenth century‖ (A, 310). Behaviors that deviated from the norm were characterized
and reified into types of abnormal individuals. Henceforth, the behaviors and actions of
these individuals ceased to be simply actions and instead became constitutive of being.
Whereas the Henriette Cornier case exemplified the psychiatry of the first half of
the century, Foucault points to the case of Charles Jouy to illustrate this new psychiatry
of conditions that emerged in the latter half. The facts of the case are quite banal: Charles
Jouy, an agricultural worker in the Nancy region, persuades a little girl to masturbate him
in return for treats or money. 13 Born an illegitimate child and orphaned quite young, Jouy
worked and lived his entire life at the margins of society. He was ―poorly educated, a bit
12

In his account in Abnormal, Foucault draws a slight distinction between the syndrome
and the condition (See A, 310-312). For Foucault, although he lists each as a concurrent
development in this new psychiatry at the end of the nineteenth century, the condition is the
―fundamental‖ term (A, 311). Despite this concurrence, the syndrome appears primarily as a
precursor to the condition. However, the distinction between the two is difficult to extract since
Foucault only touches upon the theoretical conceptualization of the syndrome while he expounds
at length the precise function of the condition. For the level of exposition in the present work, this
distinction is too fine to be pertinent.
13

I thank Mary Beth Mader for bringing to my attention the contemporary critical
debates surrounding Foucault‘s treatment of the Jouy case. Foucault reduces the interaction
between Jouy and the child to a matter of persuasion: ―Charles Jouy got her to masturbate him in
the fields‖ (A, 292). By contrast, contemporary feminists have characterized the interaction as a
transaction, promising the girl money or sweets in return for the sexual favor.
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drunk, solitary and badly paid,‖ or as Foucault summarizes, ―the village idiot‖ (A, 292).
The incident between this forty year old man and the little girl was anything but
extraordinary. In fact, according to Foucault, a similar incident ―a few years earlier would
doubtless have seemed perfectly commonplace and anodyne,‖ but in this instance, the
mayor, the girl‘s family, and the entire village appealed to the psychiatric authority for
professional intervention (A, 296). However, rather than look for the decisive break
between Jouy‘s childhood and the sexual incident, the psychiatrists find in Jouy a proper
object of psychiatry precisely because there is no break. According to the psychiatric
evaluation, the crime was not a result of some radical change in his personality that
occurred at the initiation of the pathological process, as was the case with Cornier.
Instead, Jouy‘s action is situated within ―a permanent, constitutive, congenital condition‖
(A, 298). He is not separated from his action by any discontinuity. In fact, his entire being
typifies his crime, and this fact ―allows the act to be psychiatrized‖ (A, 299). The
psychiatrists point to the physical signs of his abnormal condition:
The face and cranium do not present the standard symmetry that one should
normally find. There is a lack of proportion between trunk and limbs. The
cranium is faultily developed; the forehead recedes, which, with posterior
flattening, makes the head into a sugarloaf; the lateral sides are also flattened,
which raises the parietal bones more than is usual. 14
These physical signs along with his behavior implicate an underlying condition, the
―permanent causal background,‖ which serves as the foundation for all his abnormal
actions (A, 312). The psychiatric evaluation finds the physical and mental signs ―typical
of imbecility,‖ and this label confers upon Jouy a distinctive type of being, the being of an
imbecile (A, 298). The attribution of this fixed condition, from the constellation of
polymorphous symptoms and signs, no longer seeks to constitute the individual as ill, but
14

H. Bonnet and J. Bulard, Rapport médico-légal, 6, quoted in A, 297-98.
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rather as abnormal, for psychiatry in the second half of the nineteenth century has broken
its ties to pathology and no longer derives its power from traditional medicine. Indeed,
the deployment of the condition, which results in the constitution of a new type of being,
is precisely the point at which psychiatry establishes its authority independent from
medical authority.
The psychiatry of the latter half of the nineteenth century thus becomes a science
of the normal and abnormal. Not concerned with illness, it refocuses its attention on
deviations from the norm. In itself, each of the characteristics that point to the underlying
condition (e.g., the shape of Jouy‘s skull) is not a pathological fact. Rather, it is a
deviation from the norm, a sign of abnormality, but again, each deviation in itself is not
sufficient to constitute a new type of being. Only when it ―appear[s] within the
constellation in which it figures‖ does it become constitutive of an abnormal individual
(A, 307). If they occur, illnesses are necessarily secondary, derivative phenomena ―with
regard to this condition that is fundamentally a condition of abnormality‖ (A, 307).
Opposing the condition of abnormality to the normal individual, this reconfiguration of
psychiatry focuses on the ―reality of lack‖ and the ―visible consequence of this primary
and fundamental lack‖ (A, 300). That is, the condition, structured as a deviation from the
norm, is fundamentally negative, an absence of normality. It is the lack of inhibitions, a
deficiency in development, which link the condition to the aberrant behavior. Thus, the
abnormal individuals that populate the domain of psychiatry toward the end of the
nineteenth century appear fundamentally and primarily as a visible absence, a lack of
normality.
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Although it dispenses with the positive manifestations of illness and the precise
causal chain of pathological chronology, this new psychiatry founded upon permanent
and stable conditions of abnormality did not do away with causality entirely. In fact, the
nosography of conditions developed in the latter half of the nineteenth century demanded
a causal explanation for the condition. Whence did all ―these little people[s] of abnormal
individuals‖ suddenly appearing before the psychiatric gaze come (A, 310)? For
psychiatry to maintain its newfound authority it must account for this strange
phenomenon: ―the condition must be set within a sequence that can produce it and
confirm it‖ (A, 313). However, since it just distanced itself from pathological chronology
and replaced the concept of illness with that of abnormality, psychiatry was not about to
reinscribe the condition into a pathological series within an individual. Instead, it looked
to the domain of heredity. According to Foucault, this turn to heredity positioned the
abnormal individual—―the victim, subject, and bearer‖ of the abnormal condition—
within a family lineage (A, 313). Only the ―body of heredity‖ seemed sufficiently diverse
yet powerful enough to ―definitely mark the whole of an individual‘s body‖ (A, 313).
Explaining and confirming the presence of the condition of abnormality via
recourse to heredity has the great advantage of offering to the psychiatrist a huge pool of
individuals—parents, siblings, and ancestors—from which to find the causal link. In
addition, the study of heredity, according to Foucault, admits ―an indefinite causal
permissiveness‖ (A, 314). Thus, to explain the presence of tuberculosis or delinquent
behavior in an individual, the psychiatrist need not find a parent or relation who was also
tubercular or delinquent to confirm the presence of the condition. Rather, the demands of
heredity are not nearly so stringent. Any mental illness, or even a simply a vice such as
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drunkenness, could be identified as the causal agent. For the psychiatrist, this ―ultraliberal
functioning of heredity‖ established the fact that ―anything can be the cause of anything
else‖ (A, 314).
The introduction of the body of heredity thus undergirds the condition of
abnormality and provides the causal nexus for the transmission of the condition, both
explaining and confirming the diagnosed condition. Moreover, this recourse to heredity
further establishes the abnormal individual as a particular type of being. The formation
and development of the theoretical concept of the condition, with its foundation in
heredity, within late nineteenth-century psychiatry allowed for the emergence of
abnormal individuals bearing the permanent stigmata of the condition. Through the
development and deployment of this concept, psychiatry took diverse sets of behaviors
and symptoms and molded them into concrete, stable forms, thus creating fundamentally
new types of abnormal beings.

2.2.2 The Madman
As presented by Foucault in History of Madness, the historical formation and
emergence of the madman as a recognizable type of being resembles the development of
the grand theory of the condition in psychiatry in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Once again, a stable being—the madman—appears and crystallizes against the backdrop
of an amorphous constellation of signs and symptoms. Like the condition of the abnormal
individual, the madman in the eighteenth century is apprehended by the gaze as a
fundamental absence, a lack of reason. However, according to Foucault, a unique feature
of this perceptual apprehension of the madman is its disavowal of knowledge—the
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madman is immediately recognizable. That is to say, the madman, as a type of being,
appears in utter transparency before the gaze without first passing through the domain of
knowledge. In fact, for the eighteenth century, knowledge of madness as such was
hopelessly obscure and only fit for the idle speculations of nosographers. Nevertheless,
by virtue of her sanity and normal reasoning, any person could clearly recognize madness
insofar as it was instantiated within a particular individual. While the theoretical concept
of madness remained opaque, the peculiar being of the madman was obvious.
Since the dawning of the classical age, the historical figure of madness has
appeared before the objective gaze in an immediate perception. Apprehended by an
―enunciatory consciousness,‖ madness was always simply and immediately perceived as
present or absent.15 According to Foucault, the structure of this consciousness of madness
never appeals to any theoretical knowledge, but instead immediately recognizes the
madman as a specific type of being. The enunciatory consciousness of madness
allows for immediate pronouncements, without any detours through the world of
knowledge: ‗that man is mad‘. Here there is no question of qualifying or
disqualifying madness, but only of pointing at it as a kind of substantive
existence: there before us, the object of our gaze, is someone who is undeniably,
indisputably mad…. This consciousness is not concerned with values, peril or
risk, but is on the level of being. It is nothing more than a monosyllabic nod that
categorizes at a glance,…. a simple perceptive apprehension. (HM, 166)
Madness thus appears to the gaze in the being of the madman. He is a peculiar type of
man, devoid of reason all the while imitating it, yet the perceptual consciousness of
madness does not become mired in the multiplicity of possible manifestations of the
madman‘s madness. It does not dwell on the vacant stare, the incoherent mumblings, the
incessant and meaningless gesturing. It does not catalog the signs and symptoms to arrive
15

Michel Foucault, History of Madness, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa (New
York: Routledge, 2006), 166, (hereafter cited in text as HM).
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at the conclusion: ‗that man is mad‘. All that is unnecessary. Instead, it completely
bypasses the domain of knowledge and holds no pretensions that it knows what madness
is. For the enunciatory consciousness, madness simply appears as the type of being of the
madman. This eighteenth-century structure of madness ―recognized the madman, while
simultaneously admitting its incapacity to define madness itself‖ (HM, 180). Whereas
―madness has a confused, distant, almost imperceptible outline,‖ according to Foucault,
―the madman has an immediately precise, obvious, concrete character‖ (HM, 180).
This immediate perception of the madman as a peculiar type of being occurs
despite a lack of positive symptoms and a definitive sign. By the beginning of the
eighteenth century, madness had lost its distinctive character. Unlike in the Renaissance,
when madness ―had made its presence manifest through innumerable signs, threatening
reason with immediate contradiction,‖ the madness of the classical age was much more
subtle (HM, 178). Indeed, according to Foucault, by the turn of the century, ―madness
[had] grown sufficiently subtle to have lost all visible, assignable form‖ (HM, 176).
Madness had shed ―its real plenitude,‖ and instead of presenting itself with positive
phenomena, it became characterized by a lack (HM, 176). Thus, the critical problems
posed by madness itself to the theoretical and discursive understanding of madness in the
classical age were questions of identity: ―How could the madman be recognized…? How
could he be singled out without error?‖ (HM, 175) The attempt to respond to these
pressing questions of identity was further confounded by madness‘ affinity to reason,
since ―there is in madness an essential aptitude for mimicking reason‖ (HM, 176-77). For
the classical age, madness was to be found everywhere, even lurking within reason itself.
Even an individual‘s arrival at wisdom could not guarantee an absence of madness, since

82

madness, as an aspect of nature, operates at an instinctual level to ―ensure that, man,
despite himself is the instrument of wisdom‖ (HM, 177). In this way, madness and
unreason were the handmaidens of reason. They offered shortcuts to wisdom, bypassing
the difficult terrain and ―arduous paths‖ of reason (HM, 177). By the eighteenth century,
madness had become a more diffuse presence, devoid of obvious signs, exterior to
the world of the senses, in the secret reign of a universal reason. It was at once
plenitude and total absence: inhabiting all regions of the world, it spared no
wisdom, no order, and escaped destruction by the senses. It was present
everywhere, but never in that which made it what it is. (HM, 178)
This diffusion and proliferation of madness and its elusive nature, hiding just below the
surface of reason, made it difficult to identify and pin down with any theoretical
accuracy. The problem of madness thus seemed irresolvable for the classical age. Indeed,
this problem was irresolvable, perhaps, but not unavoidable.
The configuration of madness in the classical age rendered it structurally invisible
to the gaze. Within this configuration, a fundamental gap existed between the presence
and manifestation of madness. No definitive sign nor positive manifestation gave
madness away, yet madness, for the classical age, was an indisputable fact. This gap
between its presence and visible manifestation rendered madness structurally impossible
to locate in itself. By positing the figure of the madman as consubstantial with madness,
the invisibility of madness ceases to be a problem, since the visibility and positive
presence of the madman fills in the visible space left vacant by the lack of positive
manifestation of madness itself. Thus, although madness itself remained invisible to the
classical gaze, the being of the madman appeared as a pure, positive presence in the place
of madness. By circumscribing madness within the confines of being, the classical age
overcame this ―essential gap‖ between the ―presence and … manifestation‖ of madness‖
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(HM, 179). Madness was not permitted to recede from the ―world of evidence to an
inaccessible domain,‖ but rather was captured within the being of the madman (HM,
179). The exact coincidence of the madman with his madness ensured the truth of
madness would not be lost or hidden. Although it exhibited no definitive signs nor a
―positive presence,‖ madness appeared to the gaze ―with a sort of calm immediacy, on
the surface of the world, with no possible distance for doubt,‖ in the figure of the
madman (HM, 179). That is to say, it presented itself in this utterly lucid manner not as
madness per se, ―but rather as a recognizable type, as the madman‖ (HM, 179). Thus, the
constitution of the being of madness, instantiated in the madman himself, became the
condition of possibility for the appearance of the state of madness before the classical
gaze. In other words, to become visible, madness, like the psychiatric conditions of the
nineteenth century, must first have an ontologizing function—it must make its bearer into
a recognizable type, a peculiar sort of being, the madman.
Like the psychiatric discourses surrounding the formation of the abnormal
individual toward the end of nineteenth century, the structure of madness in the classical
age presents its object as pure negativity. Beginning in the latter part of the nineteenth
century, psychiatry ceased to invoke illness and instead located the condition within a
nexus of abnormality. That is, the condition itself is cast as ―intrinsically abnormal‖ (A,
310). Reason opposes madness as pure presence to lack. Thus, the condition for the
immediate perception of madness turns upon the visibility of reason. Madness presents
itself to the gaze not as a positive presence but as the lack of reason, or unreason itself.
According to Foucault,
there is no perception of madness other than by reference to an order of reason,
and to the consciousness that we have when confronted with a man of reason,
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which can assure us of the coherence, the logic and the continuity that underlies
his speech. (HM, 180)
It is through recourse to reason that the classical age perceives unreason. In its essential
nature, ―madness … was negativity‖ (HM, 251). However, this negativity ―offered itself
in a plenitude of phenomena, part of the well-ordered riches in the garden of species‖
(HM, 251). In front of the permanent backdrop of madness, the signs and symptoms of
the ―great figures of madness‖ were able to reify into particular types of being (HM, 251).
That is, the visible manifestations of the lack, which is madness, ―took on a particular
cohesiveness‖ to reveal ―the negativity of madness in a positive manner‖ (HM, 251).
Foucault cites the conception of dementia in the classical age as support for this claim. As
one of these great figures of madness, dementia presented with ―no clear
symptomatology‖ (HM, 257). Between the level of causes and the level of effects of
dementia there is a rupture. The multiplicity of divergent events imbued with causal
efficacy never match up with the chain of visible effects. The list of partial causes drawn
up by eighteenth-century theorists of madness is virtually endless. Nevertheless, these
causes fail to give dementia a positive form, since they all refer back to a fundamental
lack—a lack of reason. For the eighteenth century, dementia remains the ―most general
and negative empirical form of unreason all at once‖ (HM, 257). At best, these postulated
causes point out dementia but only via a ―negative result‖ (HM, 257). In other words,
they express the fundamental negativity of dementia as ―a rupture between the mind and
the outside world and truth‖ (HM, 257). Dementia, like all forms of madness, remains
fundamentally and primarily an absence of reason within classical discourse.
Characterized by this fundamental lack and an evasion of any sort of theoretical
knowledge, madness, in the classical age, could only be reached through the being of the
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madman. Since madness had neither a definitive sign nor stable symptoms itself, it had to
be instantiated within the figure of the madman. By reifying the amorphous and pervasive
nature of madness into the concrete being of the madman, the classical gaze, despite its
inability to comprehend madness, was ultimately able to apprehend madness in the
transparency of direct and immediate perception.

2.2.3 The Homosexual
In the History of Sexuality, Foucault returns to the homosexual, one of the ―little
people[s] of abnormal individuals‖ that emerge in the late nineteenth century, during the
consolidation of psychiatric power via the deployment of the grand theory of the
condition (A, 310). According to Foucault, the homosexual first appears as a peculiar type
of being in Westphal‘s 1870 article on the classification of sexual perversions. 16 Up to
that moment, although the actions and behaviors of the sodomite were well known and
regulated by the law, the acts defined as sodomy did not fundamentally alter the being of
the subject who committed them. However, with the elucidation and codification of
homosexuality in the late nineteenth century, the set of acts and behaviors characterized
as sodomy suddenly imbued the being of the perpetrators with new meaning. What had
previously been simply a forbidden act, a breach of religious or civil law, now inhered in
the being of the homosexual and held the secret to his essential truth. Thus, the abnormal
condition of homosexuality and that strange being, the homosexual, were born.
The historical emergence of the homosexual, along with a multitude of other
sexual perverts, coincides with the ascension of the Victorian regime. Although
16
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commonly characterized by the ―image of the imperial prude,‖ supposedly constraining
and silencing all but the most necessary forms of sexuality, according to Foucault, the
Victorian age did not mark the beginning of the great repression of sexuality but rather
the ―incitement to discourse‖ (HS, 3). Debunking this myth of repression, Foucault points
to the endless proliferation of discourses in the nineteenth century: the sexuality of
children and perverts was called to account for itself and put under constant surveillance,
the sexualized space of the family was studied and scrutinized, and the sexualized power
relations between teachers and pupils were analyzed and considered in the construction of
schools and dormitories. According to Foucault, ―The nineteenth century and our own
have been rather the age of multiplication: a dispersion of sexualities, a strengthening of
their disparate forms, a multiple implantation of ‗perversions.‘ Our epoch has initiated
sexual heterogeneities‖ (HS, 37). Although the aim of the admonishments against
perverse sexualities may have been the preservation of ―a sexuality that is economically
useful and politically conservative,‖ Foucault claims this aim was not achieved via
reduction (HS, 37). Under the supposed repression of sexuality during the Victorian age,
the discourses of sexuality blossomed, flourished, and spread into new domains. Rather
than inaugurating an uneasy silence, the Victorian age witnessed the emergence of a
cacophony of disparate voices engaging in discourses of sexuality, and it is from within
this milieu that the homosexual first appears and gains the status of being.
Prior to the nineteenth century, the focus of the most intense scrutiny and the
target of all sexual prescriptions was the relation of marriage. Other possible sexual
relations were neither codified nor prescribed in the same manner. In fact, they were
hardly addressed at all. At that time all other sexual relations, such as sodomy, had an
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―uncertain status‖ in the eyes of both morality and the law (HS, 37). What would come to
be known as sexual perversions in the late nineteenth century were not yet permanent and
stable conditions of being.
The being of the homosexual emerges toward the end of the nineteenth century
when the set of behaviors and actions defined as sodomy coalesce around the individual
perpetrator and solidify into a permanent type of being. The act of characterization, which
identifies the peculiar features and distinctive behaviors of the homosexual, is also the act
of constitution. From this moment onward, ―homosexuality appear[s] as one of the forms
of sexuality‖ (HS, 43). Whereas the ancient concept of sodomy exists on the level of acts,
this modern discourse of homosexuality exists on the level of being:
As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of
forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of
them. The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case
history, and a childhood. (HS, 43)
This ontological transformation forged, from a diverse set of actions, ―a type of life, a life
form, and a morphology,‖ or in other words, an entirely new type of being (HS, 43).
Rather than repress or hide the sexual perversions of the homosexual, the medical and
theoretical texts from the end of the nineteenth century sought to ―draw out‖ and expose
―these polymorphous conducts‖ in order to fix them into a stable condition (HS, 48).
As with all other conditions, homosexuality serves as a permanent backdrop. In
itself, it is not a sufficient cause, but any causal explanation must pass through and
acknowledge this abnormal condition. Within the homosexual, homosexuality ―was
everywhere present,‖ and it could give rise to any number of other abnormal behaviors
since it was positioned ―at the root of all his actions‖ (HS, 43). Just as madness appeared
to the classical gaze in complete coincidence with the madman, so too does
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homosexuality in the late nineteenth century. According to Foucault, the homosexual‘s
homosexuality is ―consubstantial with him‖ (HS, 43). He is not an individual who
happens to be afflicted with this abnormal condition, but rather he is this condition—
homosexuality is his ―singular nature‖ (HS, 43). Through this incorporation of
perversions, the homosexual‘s being absorbs his homosexuality and is transformed by it:
Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed
from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism
of the soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was
now a species. (HS, 43)
Through the action of the medical and technical discourses of sexuality, homosexuality
comes to present itself as an ―alien strain,‖ and the homosexual himself as a peculiar type
of being (HS, 44). The consolidation of divergent behaviors thus forms the permanent
condition ―imbedded in [the] bod[y]‖ that both signifies homosexuality and transforms
the human being into the being of the homosexual (HS, 44).
Emerging from psychiatry in the late nineteenth century, the concept of
homosexuality, as a permanent condition of abnormality, appeals not to the pathological
model of illness but rather refers back to normal sexuality. Like the configuration of
madness in the eighteenth century, the discourses proliferating around sexuality were also
normative, setting the deviant behaviors apart from the normal. The marital relation,
which dominated all discussion and analysis of sexual relations prior to the explosion of
discourse at the end of the nineteenth century, reappeared within the proliferation and
incorporation of perversions. However, now it was granted a modicum of discretion, and
instead of receiving the brunt of attention, it began to ―function as a norm‖ (HS, 38).
According to Foucault, ―the legitimate couple, with its regular sexuality‖ served as the
ideal point of reference from which to pick out the sexual deviants (HS, 38). The
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establishment of this normal sexuality contrasted with the abnormal characteristics of the
sexual perversions, casting them as developmental deficiencies that fell short of the norm.
Against a backdrop of normal sexuality and sexual development, the deviant sexual
behaviors stood out as black on white. By situating homosexuality within this normative
discourse, late nineteenth-century psychiatry described it in purely negative terms:
homosexuality and the other sexual perversions were a set of ―‗incomplete‘ sexual
practices,‖ characterized as deficiencies, ―instinctual ‗disturbances,‘‖ or interrupted
development (HS, 41). Despite the multitude of positive manifestations detailed in the
extensive studies of these ―minor perverts‖ of the nineteenth century, the primary
characteristic of the homosexual was a lack—a lack of normality (HS, 43).
Following the model of the abnormal condition, homosexuality, in many ways, is
just like any other psychiatric condition: it creates a new type of being from a farraginous
system of behaviors, actions, and features, and it deploys the concept of normality rather
than pathology. However, homosexuality has a distinctive feature—its structure as ―a
secret that always [gives] itself away‖ (HS, 43). This key structure serves to distinguish
homosexuality from the classical consciousness of madness. One might object that
madness, too, was an inaccessible secret, hidden from the classical gaze. Indeed, madness
itself was elusive, evading the quest for knowledge, but this secret knowledge of madness
remained a secret. What presented itself to the enunciatory consciousness of the
eighteenth century was never madness in itself, but only the madman. By contrast,
Foucault claims a special status for sexuality in general and homosexuality in particular.
The condition of homosexuality presents with a host of signs and symptoms ―written
immodestly on [the] face and the body‖ of the homosexual (HS, 43). It is a unique
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―morphology‖ (HS, 43). Nevertheless, it is ontologically structured as a secret.
Regardless of how many times it speaks its name, either voluntarily or involuntarily, how
many morphological observations signify its presence, or how many psychiatric
evaluations conclude it is so, the being of the homosexual, despite these disclosures,
remains constitutionally a secret. This injection of secrecy between being and knowledge,
in this case, does not mean the psychiatrist can obtain no knowledge of homosexuality;
the studies, evaluations, and discourses proliferating at the end of the nineteenth century
do, in fact, achieve the level of theoretical knowledge of homosexuality, precisely
because the secret of homosexuality always gives itself away.
Unlike the classical configuration of madness, the appearance of the abnormal
condition of the homosexual toward the end of the nineteenth century reveals its essential
nature. Forged within the raging fires of discourse during the Victorian age, the
homosexual emerges as a new type of being, a codification and solidification of diverse
behaviors and traits into a stable configuration.

2.3 The Dangerous Individual and Social Protection
According to Foucault‘s account in Abnormal, the historical formation of the
concept of the dangerous individual coincides with the constitution of psychiatry as a
medical specialization in the nineteenth century. It emerges from the discourses deployed
by the expert psychiatric opinion in order to secure its position and authority mediating
between the scientific production of truth and the judicial practices of justice. In fact,
according to Foucault, it is precisely this placement of the expert psychiatric opinion in
the liminal space between truth and justice that serves as the condition of possibility for
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the dangerous individual to appear before the psychiatric gaze. Linking together judicial
and medical power, psychiatric expert opinion engages in discourses that ultimately have
the power of life and death, yet these discourses, which obtain the status of truth in the
courtroom, are neither properly judicial nor properly scientific. That is, the psychiatric
discourses of expert testimony, from which the dangerous individual emerges, do not
meet the epistemological standards for truth in either discipline. These discourses
constitute the dangerous individual as a particular type of being with recognizable traits
as their exclusive object of knowledge. This individual belongs exclusively to psychiatry
and not organic medicine, for instance, because psychiatry claims that only it can
recognize the individual‘s origins, thus only it can perceive the dangerous individual.
Only the psychiatric gaze can see what is not yet visible—the crime yet to be committed.
On the basis of this concept, psychiatric expert opinion presents itself as a science of
prediction, offering foreknowledge of danger to come, thereby establishing itself as an
invaluable institution for the protection of society. This heterogeneous concept of the
dangerous individual thus appears before the psychiatric gaze on a plane bounded on one
side by the twin poles of danger-protection and on the other by the medical-judicial.
Forensic psychiatry, this strange amalgam of the medical and judicial, in which
the dangerous individual begins to take shape, attempts to conjoin these two
heterogeneous types of power. Operating as the ―switch-point‖ between the medical and
judicial institutions, the expert opinion functions by ―stitching together the judicial and
the medical,‖ but it neither follows the rules of the judicial system nor the ―internal
norms of medical knowledge‖ (A, 41). According to Foucault, it is ―infrapathological‖
and ―paralegal‖ or ―parapathological‖ and ―infralegal‖ (A, 18). In this flagrant violation
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of both domains, the power of the psychiatric opinion assumes a ―grotesque‖ aspect (A,
11). Foucault does not employ this term as ―an insulting epithet‖ (A, 11). Rather, for him,
it is a concept with a precise function:
I am calling ‗grotesque‘ the fact that, by virtue of their status, a discourse or an
individual can have effects of power that their intrinsic qualities should disqualify
them from having…. I think that there is a precise category, or, in any case, that
we should define a precise category of historico-political analysis, that would be
the category of the grotesque or Ubu-esque. Ubu-esque terror, grotesque
sovereignty, or, in starker terms, the maximization of power on the basis of the
disqualification of the one who produces them. (A, 11-12)17
The power of the psychiatric expert opinion fits this description, since it produces a
discourse wielding tremendous power over life and death only by adopting ―a childish
discourse that disqualifies [the psychiatrist] as a scientist at the very moment [she] is
appealed to as a scientist‖ (A, 36). That is, the expert opinion obtains access to judicial
power and effects even though she lacks the qualification to wield that power. She is
appealed to by the judge precisely for her epistemic position as an expert, a psychiatrist,
and yet her characterization as a psychiatrist and not a member of the judiciary, precludes
her from actually obtaining the judicial qualities and characterization that should be
necessary to exercise judicial power. The court calls upon the psychiatrist precisely for
her characterization as a psychiatrist, but as such she does not have the qualities of the
judiciary. Despite not having the qualities of a member of the judiciary, the Ubu-esque
function of power recasts her childish pronouncements and puerile analyses—e.g., ―He
played with wooden weapons.‖ ―He cut off the heads of cabbages.‖ ―He was a trial to his
parents.‖ (A, 36)—as ―true discourses with considerable judicial effects‖ (A, 11). Thus,
According to the editors of Foucault‘s Abnormal lectures, the term Ubu-esque
originates from the ridiculous figure of the King Ubu in Alfred Jarry‘s 1896 play, Ubu roi. They
cite a 1985 French dictionary definition of Ubuesque: ―Someone resembling the figure of King
Ubu (in his comically and extravagantly cruel, cynical, or cowardly character‖ (Le Grand Robert
in A, 28n20).
17
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even though the grotesque, ―Ubu-science‖ of psychiatry is not properly qualified to
exercise judicial power , the concept of the dangerous individual to which it gives birth
achieves the status of medical and judicial truth.
To constitute the dangerous individual, psychiatry first creates a double of the
individual to be psychiatrized and then shifts ―the level of reality of the offense‖ from the
actual act in question to the double (A, 16). This doubling of the individual offense
converts it into a character trait. In other words, psychiatry shifts the focus from the
actual criminal offense to the abnormal condition of the individual, that is, the double. In
this way, the expert opinion ―delegalize[s] the offense,‖ since in the same move, it both
obscures the person who committed the act and brings to light a pyschologico-moral
double that, in fact, never committed a crime (A, 16). This shift then allows psychiatry a
foothold into the purely judicial realm of the courtroom. Without this dual process of
doubling and replacement, psychiatry could have no legitimate claim to power, since its
concepts, diagnoses, and tools are not judicial: ―There is no law against being affectively
unbalanced or having emotional disturbances. There is no law against having perverted
pride, and there are no legal measures against Herostratism‖ (A, 16). The psychiatric
double, which transfers the discourse from the level of the act to the level of being,
recasts the offense at the level of the permanent condition, the being, of the offender. In
this way, the state of being of the dangerous individual—her emotional disturbances, her
nastiness, or her stubbornness—becomes construed as her criminal act. In this way,
psychiatry brings the dangerous individual and not the criminal offender before the court.
According to Foucault, the expert opinion constructs a double through which one can
―pass from the action to conduct, from an offense to a way of being‖ (A, 16). In effect,
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the formation of the psychologico-moral double supplants the original offender. This shift
in ―the level of reality of the offense‖ is particularly evident in the practices of special
courts for children (A, 16). In these courts, children never appear before the judge alone.
Instead, they are always accompanied by the psychiatrist‘s evaluation of their
―psychological, social, and medical‖ background, information which pertains not to the
offense in question but to the child‘s ―existence, life, and discipline‖ (A, 40). On the basis
of this information, the judge will issue her decision. The offense itself will not be the site
of judicial intervention. Rather, the being of the child will be punished. Likewise, it is the
character of the dangerous individual, presented by the psychiatric testimony, and not the
actual individual whom the judge will find guilty. Thanks to psychiatric expert opinion,
the judge can no longer convict the individual on the basis of crime in question even if
the individual is, in fact, guilty, since the individual never appears in court without the
double. About this result, Foucault writes: ―even if the subject in question is guilty, what
the judge is able to condemn in him on the basis of expert psychiatric opinion is no
longer the crime or offense exactly‖ (A, 17). Instead, the judge will punish the roots of
the crime, ―the irregular forms of conduct that were put forward as the crime‘s cause and
point of origin,‖ or in other words, the psychologico-moral double (A, 17).
The expert opinion effects this transposition from original offense to psychiatric
double by demonstrating that the dangerous individual always already resembles her
crime. Psychiatry investigates and analyzes the condition of the individual before the
crime, cataloging the ―faults that are not illegal‖ in order to reveal the continuity between
the individual before and after the crime (A, 19). For instance, it notes that in her
childhood, the individual on trial for murder killed a bird or tortured a cat. In these
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juvenile acts of disobedience, the psychiatrist can see ―a kind of reconstruction of the
crime itself, in scaled-down version‖ (A, 20). Tracing a series of childhood ―misdeeds,‖
the expert opinion links these acts to the current crime through the ―repetitive use of the
adverb already‖: as a young girl, she already showed signs of domination or
delinquency, or she already exhibited a tendency towards violence (A, 19). These
―biographical elements,‖ according to Foucault, have no bearing on the offense in
question—they ―do not in any way explain the action in questions‖—but rather ―are
kinds of miniature warning signs, little scenes from childhood…that are presented as
already analogous to the crime‖ (A, 33). Nevertheless, the shift in the reality of the
offense from the level of the act itself to the level of being (i.e., the psychologico-moral
double) allows these ‗insights‘ to obtain legal standing, since the double, which the
psychiatrist describes, now constitutes the offense. From this analysis, the expert can then
conclude it was simply a matter of time before the dangerous individual revealed her
abnormal or ―criminal desire‖ in a violent crime, since all along she already was her
crime (A, 20).
By pulling together the medical and the judicial and securing the seam between
them, the psychiatric expert opinion creates of these disparate institutions a medicojudicial continuum. Prior to the nineteenth century, psychiatry was called before the court
to pass judgment on the mental state of the accused. If she were mentally ill, then the
court would turn her over to the doctors for a cure, since ―madness wipes out the crime‖
(A, 32-33). Only if she were sane would her actions merit punishment. All that changed
with the historico-political emergence of the psychiatric expert opinion in the nineteenth
century. The insertion of the expert opinion between the law and medicine obliterates
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these as separate discourses and replaces the historical institutional alternative of ―either
prison or hospital‖ with a new ―protective continuum‖ (A, 33). According to Foucault, an
institutionalized disciplinary regime formed around and sustained by the expert opinion
operates along a continuum with the punitive and the therapeutic responses as opposing
poles. Judge and doctor, crime and illness, and punishment and cure were no longer
different in kind, but rather merely differed in degree. As Foucault notes, this line of
graduated disciplinary responses, anchored on the judicial side in the punitive and on the
medical side in the therapeutic, cannot be a response to either illness or crime. Neither
illness nor crime in their pure form would require a continuum of responses spanning
from one institution to the other. An illness would necessitate a therapeutic response and
a crime a judicial response. According to Foucault, this continuum is in response to
something entirely new: ―This continuum with its therapeutic and judicial poles, this
institutional mixture, is actually a response to danger‖ (A, 34).
Since the concept of danger and its embodiment in the dangerous individual
emerge from within the discourse of the medico-legal expert opinion of the psychiatrist,
psychiatry lays claim to these concepts and institutes itself as a science of the recognition
and prediction of danger. In fact, within the medico-judicial continuum, psychiatry
assumes epistemic privilege over both danger and the dangerous individual. After this
transformation in medical and judicial power in the nineteenth century, the judge no
longer calls upon the psychiatrist simply to assess the sanity of the accused. Instead, the
judge poses a new question for the psychiatrist to answer: ―Is the individual dangerous?‖
(A, 25). It is a question both of probability and of recognition. The psychiatrist must
testify about ―whether the subject analyzed has traits or forms of conduct that, in terms of
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criminality, make it probable that there will be a breach of the law‖ (A, 22). However, not
all projections into the future and not all tabulations of probabilities are equal. While the
psychiatrist may not be the only one who can ferret out danger, she is the only one
capable of detecting the possibility of danger. Whereas for someone else, the ―detection
of possible danger‖ may be a matter of tallying probabilities, this is not so for the
psychiatrist (A, 120). She has no need for probabilities and does not predict in the proper
sense because she actually perceives potential danger:
To justify itself as a scientific and authoritative intervention in society, as the
power and science of public hygiene and social protection, mental medicine must
demonstrate that it can detect a certain danger, even when it is not yet visible to
anyone else. (A, 120)
For this reason, according to Foucault, psychiatry took such a great interest in motiveless
crimes in the nineteenth century. When the standard medical and judicial authorities
could not make sense of these motiveless crimes, psychiatry came forward and claimed it
could ―recognize them when they occur‖ and could ―even predict them, or enable them to
be predicted, by diagnosing in time the strange illness that consists in committing them‖
(A, 121). Through recourse to the puerile language of the parent-child relation and the
constitution of the psychologico-moral double, psychiatry claims to have developed a
―technique that consists in singling out dangerous individuals‖ (A, 25). Prior to the
nineteenth century, the childhood signs of nastiness, stubbornness, perverted pride, etc.
foreshadowed crime or pointed to mental illness to come, but ―they signified nothing in
themselves‖ (A, 149). After psychiatry inserted itself and conjoined the medical to the
judicial, ―these elements themselves apart from any reference to either a major dementia
or a major crime‖ constituted danger and were a sufficient reason for internment. In these

98

elements, which are below the threshold of crime and madness, the psychiatrist
recognizes the dangerous individual.
By constituting the dangerous individual as the object of its specialized
knowledge, psychiatry explicitly instituted itself as the science of social protection and
control. Since it, alone of all disciplines, could recognize the signs of danger that have
―never been recognized‖ before, it took charge of these curious beings—the dangerous
individuals (A, 122). Displacing the subject who actually commits an act with the type of
being who commits criminal acts, nineteenth-century psychiatry caused the dangerous
individual to present herself to the psychiatric gaze before she could be detected by
medicine in an act of madness or law in an act of crime. With the deployment of the
concept of the dangerous individual, psychiatry thus guaranteed its authority and ensured
its role as the institution of ―generalized social defense‖ (A, 316).
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CHAPTER 3
THE EMERGENCE OF AIDS

3.1 The Theoretical Configuration of AIDS
This section brings Canguilhem‘s discussion of the different representations of
disease (from 1.1 and 1.2) to bear on the contemporary medical and scientific discourse
surrounding AIDS and HIV. Utilizing his elucidation of ontological and positivist and
totalizing and localizing theories of disease, it aims to analyze the contemporary
representation of AIDS and HIV. An analysis of the language of the CDC‘s MMWR
reveals a diversity of representations and configurations of both AIDS and HIV;
however, the CDC never explicitly acknowledges the use of any theory of disease. The
work of Canguilhem thus helps us to parse through the layers of discourse and meanings
to extract the implicit theories of disease that lie beneath these representations.
The emergence of AIDS in the late twentieth century brought together three
theories of disease: both the localizing and totalizing ontological theories and the
positivist theory. At the level of effects, the localizing ontological and positivist theories
served to confirm and reinforce one another while they, for the most part, exclude the
totalizing ontological, or subjective, experience of disease. According to Canguilhem, the
positivist theory of disease constitutes disease and health as the same in kind, differing
only in degree of intensity. This theory denies the totalizing, subjective consciousness of
disease by the sick being, labeling the experience of sickness as a mere appearance which
masks the underlying reality. The localizing ontological theory likewise places little
importance in the totalizing, subjective experience. It situates disease at the level of
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tissues and organs or within a particular physiological function, but not at the level of the
total organism. Even though an infected cut may rise to the organismic level through the
experience of pain or pressure, the localizing theory maintains that this subjective
experience is merely an epiphenomenon. The real disease is localized in the interaction
between the microbe and the body‘s immune system at the site of the cut. With the
contemporary emergence of AIDS and HIV, all three of these conceptions of disease run
together throughout the medical and scientific discourses of the CDC, although the
passage of time and the production and modification of knowledge lead to the gradual
effacement of the totalizing, subjective experience of disease by the other two
representations.

3.1.1 Totalizing, Subjective, Ontological Representations
From the earliest cases reported in the 1980s, AIDS met all the conditions to fit
Canguilhem‘s description of a totalizing, subjective, ontological disease. 1 Even though
its initial manifestation as Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP) and Kaposi‘s Sarcoma
(KS) lesions were localizable by modern medicine to the lungs and skin, respectively,
they presented themselves directly to the subjective consciousness of the total individual.
The previously healthy young men, suddenly afflicted with these diseases, recognized
1

Since the documents analyzed for this section, the MMWR, are part of a (purportedly)
objective scientific and medical discourse surrounding AIDS and HIV, the perspective of the sick
individual is categorically omitted from the account. Nevertheless, I present this section as a brief
sketch, describing the subjective foundation for objectivity, following both Canguilhem‘s account
and memoirs from the time (esp., Guibert‘s To the Friend Who Did Not Save My Life, Monette‘s
Borrowed Time: An AIDS Memoir, White‘s The Farewell Symphony, and Wojnarowicz‘s Close to
the Knives: A Memoir of Disintegration). The inclusion of this section provides a more complete
picture of the transformation in the representation of AIDS. In particular, it brings to light the
movement by the scientific and medical discourse (and consequently by the sick being himself)
away from primarily subjective and totalizing configurations of AIDS to a predominance of
localizing and positivist representations.
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themselves as sick. Indeed, these men sought out their doctors precisely because they
perceived their radical change in state from the normal to the pathological. With the onset
of these symptoms, they saw themselves as no longer normal and no longer equal to their
situations.
From the perspective of the physicians, these men were indeed sick. The
physicians recognized that these previously healthy young men had entered a
qualitatively distinct state. In the MMWR, the repeated descriptor ―previously healthy‖
man or man ―well until‖ he presented with these symptoms signifies this change of state
from one of health to one of sickness. 2 After they sought the assistance of the physician,
most of these men underwent a battery of tests to confirm their totalizing, subjective
experience of disease, or rather, to reproduce their illnesses in the form of localized
representations (i.e., bacterial cultures, viral evidence, serum titers, etc.). In other words,
these diagnostic tests double the subjective disease of the patient as the localized disease
of the physician. Nevertheless, the first presentation of the disease was as a subjective,
totalizing disease, and it was on the basis of the consciousness of the sick being that the
physicians ordered these laboratory tests and cultures.
During these early years before the development of diagnostic tests for HIV, the
totalizing, subjective configuration of AIDS (or what would soon be named AIDS)
dominated the representations. AIDS presented itself to the individual as an entirely
novel state. The person afflicted with the disease recognized a rupture, a clear

CDC, ―Pneumocystis Pneumonia—Los Angeles,‖ MMWR 30, no. 21 (1981), 1-3. The
June 5, 1981 MMWR designated after the fact as the first report of AIDS in the US describes the
cases as ―a previously healthy 33-year-old man,‖ ―a previously healthy 30-year-old man,‖ ―a
previously healthy 36-year-old man,‖ and ―a 30-year-old man well until January 1981‖ (ibid.)
This locution signifies a change in state (i.e., from health to disease), not initially discerned by a
diagnostic test, but rather by the sick being himself.
2
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demarcation between the before and after of the event of AIDS (i.e., the presentation of
symptoms). At this time, before the collection of statistically significant amounts of data
from a sufficiently large pool of patients, the entire discourse arising from the CDC rests
upon the sick being‘s conscious awareness of itself as sick. The body of knowledge
produced by the CDC and disseminated in the form of case definitions and treatment
guidelines beginning in the mid-1980s is historical knowledge of disease, founded upon
the testimony of these individuals who first experienced AIDS at the level of their total
organism.

3.1.2 Localizing Ontological Representations
The localizing ontological configuration of AIDS shares with the totalizing
ontological configuration the assertion of a qualitative difference between health and
disease. For both configurations, the pathological state is something novel with a positive
presence; it is a new mode of life. 3 However, for the localizing theories, this qualitative
change is not reflected at the level of sick being‘s consciousness of itself as sick, but
rather at the level of the virus, HIV, and the lymphocyte. That is, the ontological focus
shifts from the being of the sick organism to the being of the virus.
Despite the initial presentation of AIDS as a disease of the total organism, the
CDC discourse immediately reconfigures AIDS in local terms. While the discourse
recognizes the novelty of this pathological phenomenon, qualitatively distinct from the

3

For the patient who experiences his sickness, it is a new state, divorced from his
previous state of health. Likewise, for the CDC discourse, the individual with AIDS is a new type
of being, a being capable of transmitting HIV to others.
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previous state of health, it attempts to locate the source of the underlying disease.4 Of
course, PCP and KS were not novel, but their appearance in previously healthy young
men represented a sufficient deviation from the normal clinical presentation to constitute
something qualitatively different, something entirely new. The explanation of these novel
symptoms of disease demonstrates the modern medical tendency to localize disease.
Almost immediately and without any direct evidence, this emergent pathological
phenomenon was attributed to a previously unknown etiologic agent. 5 From the very
start, scientific and medical thought invoked a localized ontological representation of the
disease.
Canguilhem‘s account of the various representations of disease indicates this early
move by CDC doctors and scientists to both localize and ontologize AIDS was not
unique to the characterization of AIDS but rather representative of twentieth-century
medicine. He claims that effective intervention requires localization: ―To act, it is
necessary, at least to localize‖ (NP, 39). In other words, it is the desire to intervene in the
progression of disease and to aid the sick body that motivates the localized, ontological
theory of disease. In order to act against disease in the body and the epidemic in society,

4

In addition to creating an individual qualitatively distinct from his previously healthy
self, HIV infection creates a new population of individuals—those with HIV and AIDS. For
epidemiologists, this new population is qualitatively different from those not infected and also
quantifiable, demanding clear standards of reporting and techniques of surveillance.
5

Of course, this assertion is difficult to prove definitively. At best, I can point to the fact
that the CDC reports invoke an etiologic agent even before the critical moment of scientific
verification and visualization of the virus. Although the CDC hints at a possible etiologic agent
for AIDS, namely, a virus, in 1981 through explicit comparisons to transmission rates of sexually
transmitted viruses (e.g. Hepatitis B and Herpes), the first explicit postulation I uncovered
occurred in the December 10, 1982 publication about AIDS in hemophiliacs (―if the platelet
transfusion contained an etiologic agent for AIDS‖). This explicit reference to an etiologic agent
for AIDS appears five months before the scientific visualization of the virus. CDC, ―Update on
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) among Patients with Hemophilia A,‖ MMWR
31, no. 48 (1982), 644-46, 652.
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the physician and the epidemiologist must first recognize the disease and locate it within
the body and within the population. Just as the virus targets a particular, localized site
within the body (i.e., the ―primary target of HIV is the T-helper lymphocyte‖6), effective
treatment must target a site localized to a specific viral protein. Indeed, under this
configuration of disease, effective treatment is only possible if the disease is localized or
at least potentially localizable. A parallel mechanism occurs at the level of
epidemiology. For the CDC to prevent new infections it must localize its action and
―target risk-reduction in high risk groups.‖7 To be able to localize the virus, one must first
be able to see it. In other words, the etiologic agent must become visible to the scientist
or doctor, either directly through magnification or indirectly through diagnostic tests. By
establishing both the being of the virus and localizing it during infection and
transmission, the CDC forms the virus into an ontological being and locates it as the
practical site for therapeutic intervention. 8
Structured by this relation between visibility and knowledge, the phenomenon of
AIDS emerges at the end of the twentieth century within the scientific and medical
discourses of the CDC as a localizable and ontological disease. The condition of

CDC, ―Current Trends Estimates of HIV Prevalence and Projected AIDS Cases:
Summary of a Workshop, October 31-November 1, 1989,‖ MMWR 39, no. 7 (1990), 110-12, 11719.
6

CDC, ―Current Trends Partner Notification for Preventing Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV) Infection—Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, Virginia,‖ MMWR 37, no. 25 (1988),
393-6, 401-2.
7

By invoking the language of ‗forming‘ or ‗making‘ over the typical scientific notion of
discovery, I am trying to emphasize the connection between visualization and scientific
knowledge. Only the visible virus, isolated and localized by various scientific techniques, could
have the ontological status of being. Before this moment of visualization, the hypothesized
etiologic agent does not does not exist—in an ontologically rigorous sense—for scientific
knowledge. For this reason, the language of forming a being or conferring being upon the virus
seems applicable in this case.
8
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possibility for scientific and medical knowledge is a certain transparency before the gaze,
and AIDS first breaches the visible, phenomenal field in the five men from Los Angeles
who develop PCP, a rare pneumonia in 1981. 9 According to the natural history of PCP,
acquired through the documentation of previous cases, this disease only occurs in
severely immunocompromised patients. Confident in this knowledge of PCP, the
physicians and epidemiologists at the CDC posit some ―underlying cause for immune
deficiency.‖10 Some thing, some microscopic cause, some ―transmissible agent‖ must
have weakened the immune system of these five individuals, opening the doors for the
pneumonia to establish residency within their bronchi. 11 In this way, the PCP, which, in
Canguilhem‘s terms, is the subjective totalizing disease (i.e., the disease that the living
being perceives as interrupting its course and making the being feel no longer normal),
becomes for the scientific and medical discourse merely a symptom of the underlying
disease, which is imperceptible to consciousness. The medical and scientific discourse
inserts the real cause of disease as some (potentially) visible and localizable microbe.
Thus, this ontological, localizable disease replaces the subjective disease of the total
organism within the discourses of the CDC.
This move on the part of scientists and doctors to posit an underlying etiologic
agent of immunosuppression fits within the available theories of disease at the end of the
twentieth century. According to Canguilhem, even before Pasteur, but especially after his
development of the germ theory, the ontological, localizing representation of disease

9

CDC, ―Pneumocystis Pneumonia—Los Angeles,‖ MMWR 30, no. 21 (1981), 1-3.

CDC, ―Current Trends Prevention of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS):
Report of Inter-Agency Recommendations,‖ MMWR 32, no. 8 (1983), 101-3.
10

11

Ibid.
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became the dominant representation of disease deployed to understand transmissible
diseases. In other words, infectious and parasitic diseases strongly ―favor the ontological
theory,‖ and this fact helps explain the willingness of the CDC to hypothesize an
underlying cause without any direct evidence (NP, 41). Although the etiologic agent, the
retrovirus HIV, would not make its first appearance in the visible realm in French and
American laboratories until the middle of 1983, the CDC explicitly hypothesized a
transmissible agent as the possible cause of AIDS by 1982. In this way, the CDC
implicitly invoked the ontological and localizing theory of disease and posited an unseen
―etiologic agent‖ in order to ‗see‘ within the visible manifestation of PCP the indication
of a still-unknown and -unseen causative agent.12
The deployment of this theory of disease must be understood in the public health
context in which it emerges. The CDC is an agency of action. Its mission is to ensure the
public health, halt the transmission of disease, and avert catastrophe. 13 However, in order
to act, according to Canguilhem, action requires the ability to see and localize. Thus, in
hypothesizing an underlying cause of immunosuppression, the CDC opens up the
possibility of intervention. ―To see an entity is already to foresee an action‖ (NP, 40). By
‗seeing‘ the initial unexplained cases of PCP or the later cases of KS as signs of a hidden
cause, the CDC positions itself to respond to the threat of this new disease. While it
effaces the subjective experience of disease, this conferral of ontological status of being
to this as-yet-unseen cause is tantamount to recognition of the foe to be conquered.

CDC, ―Epidemiologic Notes and Reports Possible Transfusion-Associated Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)—California,‖ MMWR 31, no. 48 (1982), 652-54.
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The localizing, ontological representation of disease, deployed by the CDC even
before it had ‗seen‘ the causal agent, received support by the twentieth-century scientific
technologies of visualization. The discovery of HIV, the etiologic agent of AIDS, in 1983
by Gallo and Barré-Sinoussi, was interpreted as confirmation and ratification of the
CDC‘s hypothesis. 14 Henceforth, no one within these scientific and medical discourses
would question the ontological status and reality of the being of HIV, since it was now
visible before the gaze. The electron micrographs of the virus budding on the cell surface
of human lymphocytes reproduced in the May 20, 1983 issue of Science were sufficient
to quell any lingering doubts.15 The medical and scientific discourse surrounding AIDS
construed this new evidence as confirmation of the configuration of AIDS as a
localizable ontological disease. Propelled by this new evidence, the discourse replaced
the ontological disease that presented itself to the patient‘s consciousness in the early
1980s to the scientifically localizable being of the virus.
According to Canguilhem, one of the key distinguishing features of ontological
configurations of disease is their representation of the disease as something
fundamentally new. He highlights this feature in order to contrast it to the positivist
representation. Under the positivist representation, disease is not radically separated from
what came before, but instead is only different in degree. Disease takes on a purely
14

Between the viral identification in 1983 until 1986, the virus had various names. For
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T-lymphotropic retrovirus from a patient at risk for acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS),‖ Science 220 (1983), 868-71. For the concurrently published American article, see R.C.
Gallo, et al., ―Isolation of human T-cell leukemia virus in acquired immune deficiency syndrome
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negative form, characterized by absence and lack. Both the localizing and totalizing
ontological theories represent the state of disease as something new. That is, this
representation of disease as a positive manifestation of a novel mode of life is common to
both the totalizing and localizing ontological theories. For the former, the total organism
recognizes the change in her relation to her environment and tasks. She experiences
disease at a conscious level as a new mode of life, completely divorced from her previous
state of health. For the latter, it is the doctor or the scientist who perceives the change.
Sickness, under the localizing, ontological conception, lodges within the body in the
organs and the tissues. It occurs below the level of consciousness and hence never
appears as a subjective disease.16 Thus, only the doctor or scientist can isolate and see the
positive presence of a fundamental new state.
The localizing, ontological representation of the disease, confirmed by the
recognition and identification of the etiologic agent of AIDS in May 1983, creates a
definite qualitative difference between the normal and the pathological. Under this
conception, there is a decisive rupture between health and disease, evidenced by the event
of infection. Interpreted in light of the event of infection, disease becomes characterized
as a ―polemical situation‖ (NP, 41); it is now characterized as struggle between the virus
and the immune system localized on the surface of one specific type of lymphocyte.
According to Canguilhem, the assertion of a qualitative difference between health
and disease corresponds to ontological representations of disease. With a totalizing,
ontological representation of disease, one does not experience sickness as essentially the
same in kind as the normal state, a mere quantitative variation, but rather, one perceives
16
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sickness to be something fundamentally new. The event of disease effects a radical break
in the continuity of life and inaugurates a fundamentally new mode of being. In relation
to both its previous state and to its environment, the sick being recognizes itself to have
been radically cleaved from its former healthy state. Life, after the event of sickness,
takes on an entirely new meaning for the living being. This description, however, does
not accurately describe the event of infection with HIV. In this localizing, ontological
representation, HIV enters the body. In other words, something fundamentally new joins
the body, so this representation resists the positivist account of disease. There is no way
to account for the sudden presence of HIV as an excess or deficiency in some normal
physiological process. However, the event of infection with HIV, in general, has no affect
upon consciousness. The living being does not recognize itself in a changed state, and its
previous course of action has not been interrupted. Thus, while the ontological nature of
this representation indicates a fundamental change in state has occurred, the localizing
aspect ensures there is no subjective experience of disease.
Based upon a localizing, ontological representation of the emergent disease, the
scientific and medical discourses of HIV and AIDS arising from the CDC in the 1980s
attributed a positive presence to the being of the disease. The ability to localize the virus
and ‗see‘ it accounts for its ontological status as a being. After the scientific elucidation
of the etiologic agent, the human immunodeficiency virus, scientists worked to isolate the
virus in individual patients and to further localize its presence within the body. By 1985,
the CDC reports HIV ―has been isolated from blood, semen, saliva, tears, breast milk,
and urine and is likely to be isolated from some other body fluids, secretions, and
excretions, but epidemiologic evidence has implicated only blood and semen in
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transmission.‖17 This ability to identify, isolate, and render visible the etiologic agent,
either directly via microscopy or indirectly via antibody testing or other means,
establishes the indisputable positive reality of the disease. With this evidence in hand, no
one could attempt to classify HIV as a positivist disease, arising from a mere change in
intensity in the normal physiology. According to Canguilhem, within ontological
representations of disease, ―a vulgar hierarchy of diseases‖ exists in which a disease is
more fully a disease the more localizable it is (NP, 39). This scientific quest to pinpoint
the precise location of the virus in the body can thus be understood as an attempt to
confer maximal reality onto it. By elucidating its precise location and revealing the virus
in its positive presence, these scientific practices aimed to enable more potent therapeutic
intervention.
This development in scientific knowledge of HIV and AIDS translated into
developments in clinical and diagnostic knowledge as well. New diagnostic tests were
devised to quickly and accurately identify the presence of the virus from a patient‘s blood
sample. From this new diagnostic tool, the qualitative difference between health and
disease became apparent. Of course, this qualitative difference did not occur at the level
of the total organism, but instead occurred well below the level of consciousness.
Nevertheless, the deployment of localizing, ontological representations of the disease
detects illness before there is a patient.18 In the words of Canguilhem, by utilizing this
conception of disease, ―the disease which never existed in the man‘s consciousness

CDC, ―Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human-T
Lymphotropic Virus Type III/ Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace,‖ MMWR
34, no. 45 (1985), 682-86, 691-95.
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begins to exist in the physician‘s science‖ (NP, 92). Without evidence of the virus, the
generalized immune suppression of AIDS might appear as a decline or degradation, a
mere slippage on the sliding scale of health. 19 If ever there were a continuum connecting
the normal and the pathological, this diagnostic test demonstrated that it had no
explanatory power when it came to understanding the phenomenon of AIDS. The HIV
antibody test arbitrates between two fundamentally different states. It is a question of
either/or: either the test reveals the positive presence of the virus or it reveals its absence.
The hiatus separating these two manifestations cannot be crossed. From this localizing,
ontological perspective, health and disease correspond to the mutually exclusive test
results, negative and positive, respectively.
Although a necessary result of any serologic antibody test, the designation of the
diseased state as positive does, in fact, emphasize the recognition by modern science that
the disease is something new, a positive manifestation, rather than simply an absence of
health. In other words, the positive test result signifies the positive reality of the invisible
virus. When a diagnostic test returns a positive result, it describes an addition. However,
this addition is not to be interpreted as a mere increase or augmentation of what was
already there beyond a certain threshold, but instead, it highlights the addition of
something entirely new. For Canguilhem‘s analysis of ontological representations of
disease, this point is absolutely crucial. Under these configurations, disease appears as
something entirely new. For the totalizing, subjective, ontological representations,
disease is not an absence of health or a lack of norms, but rather it is a novel mode of
being, a new way of life. With the localizing ontological representations, such as the ones
19
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deployed to explain AIDS and HIV, disease still signifies something entirely new.
However, this novelty does not occur at the level of the living being. That is to say, the
living being with a disease under the localizing ontological representation will not
experience a novel mode of being or a new way of life. In fact, it is questionable whether
it is even proper to speak of a living being with this sort of disease. Since the localizing,
ontological disease exists at the level of the organ, the tissue, or the cell, this disease does
not properly belong to the living being as a total organism. This disease belongs either to
the scientist, who ‗sees‘ it, or, perhaps, to the organ, tissue, or cell, but not to the total
organism. Perhaps, in the case of HIV, the disease belongs to the lymphocytes. 20 Despite
this lack of novelty at the level of the living being, in the eyes of medicine the positive
result of the diagnostic test for HIV reveals something new that was not there before
when the test returned a negative result. ―Conversion from a negative result on a previous
serologic test to a positive result in a subsequent test is considered indicative of new
infection.‖21 From the perspective of the medical and scientific discourse that deploys
this localizing, ontological representation, the positive test result is a positive signifier of
the rupture from the previous state of health of the patient, despite the patient‘s lack of
any firsthand subjective awareness of this rupture.
The description of the event of HIV infection employed by the CDC confirms its
configuration of the disease as a state qualitatively distinct from health. When the CDC
discourse considers the event of infection, it recognizes the rupture caused by the sudden
20
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presence of virus in the body. Focusing on the absence or presence of the virus, these
documents stress the radical alteration which signifies the transition between these two
states. The language of ―transmission‖ and ―acquisition‖ deployed within the CDC
documents to describe this phenomenon highlight the addition of something entirely new
to the infected body. 22 This language reinforces the ontological status of the virus: it is
the ―causative agent‖ of disease, a mobile being which circulates within and between
bodies.23 Crucially, however, in acquiring this agent of disease, visible only to the
scientist or doctor, the individual, by the action of this discourse, becomes a new sort of
being—a sick being—despite the fact that the disease has not yet reached the level of
consciousness and thus does not properly belong to total organism. The language of the
CDC ‗sees‘ a qualitatively new state of being for the individual with a positive result, but
the individual does not experience this qualitative transformation firsthand. By
emphasizing the moment of viral transmission, the CDC discourse calls attention to the
novelty in the transformation, since it is through this transmission that the presence of the
virus replaces its previous absence in the body.
In their interpretation of the event of infection, these CDC documents describe
this transformation as a process of ―conversion.‖ 24 Thus, the movement within a body
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from seronegativity to seropositivity defies any notion of a linear progression. This
cannot be simply a movement along a continuum, a quantitative increase or decrease in
intensity. Rather, the insertion of the virus engenders within the newly-infected being a
conversion, causing a radical break between the past and future from the point of view of
the objective scientific discourse. Similar to any conscious act of conversion in which
one‘s previous beliefs and behaviors lose all meaning, the event of seroconversion in the
newly-infected being is understood by the CDC discourse as an instantaneous break, a
rupture, or a mutation, rather than the slow progress of a potentially predictable or
inevitable evolution. The sudden appearance of serologic evidence for HIV infection
marks the advent of a radically altered state according to the CDC discourse. To reiterate,
this radical transformation does not occur at the level of the total organism. The
localizing, ontological representations of disease do not even address the level of the total
organism. Instead, this qualitative change in state occurs only within the scientific
discourse and not within the consciousness of the patient.
The presence of serologic evidence of the virus, which constitutes a radical,
qualitative transformation from health to disease for the scientific discourse, may in turn
be taken up by the consciousness of the living being. That is to say, the effects of the
medical and scientific discourse more than likely will encourage the living being to
experience the knowledge of seroconversion as the event of disease. However, any effect
at the level of consciousness is simply a mirroring of the rupture in health created by the
discourse. Since the event of seroconversion occurs at a level below consciousness, it
cannot constitute a subjective disease in the strict sense maintained by Canguilhem. The

in the US had increased sufficiently for the CDC to update its AIDS classification to require a
positive serologic diagnosis.
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medical and scientific discourse constitutes this test result as a rupture, a dividing line
between health and disease, and this medical classification might produce a
corresponding rupture in conscious state—the infected individual may ‗experience‘
himself to have moved from a healthy to diseased state. Nevertheless, this effect on
consciousness is secondary and does not obtain the real level of subjective disease
according to Canguilhem‘s formulation.
From the point of view of the scientific discourse, not only does the insertion of
the virus into the body transport the individual from a state of health to one of sickness, it
also crystallizes into a specific type of being: the ―seroconverter.‖25 Infection with HIV
thus effects an ontological transformation at the discursive level, creating a new type of
being. Whether for expediency‘s sake or some other reason, the grammatical shift from
the adjectival ―man who seroconverted‖ or ―those who seroconverted‖ to the nominal
―seroconverter‖ or ―seroconverters‖ reifies this transformation in HIV status—the change
from absence to presence—as a fixed state of being from the point of view of the medical
and scientific discourse of the CDC.26 From the perspective of the individual, by contrast,
there is no direct experience of a transformation in being at the level of subjective
consciousness, since this process of conversion does not constitute a disease of the total
being. Nevertheless, the discourse of the CDC construes this serologic evidence of the
presence of the virus in the body not as a lack, a slippage away from health toward death,
but rather as a positive sign inaugurating an entirely new mode of being.

CDC, ―Current Trends Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in the
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When the medical and scientific discourses arising from the CDC publications
focus on the event of infection and the causative agent, they interpret HIV and AIDS
through the rubric of a localizing, ontological disease. This fact, however, should come as
no surprise, since Canguilhem, in his characterization of the different theories of disease,
indicates infectious diseases lend themselves to this conceptualization. With infectious
diseases, one can localize, identify, and render visible the cause of infection, thus
granting the etiologic agent the status of being. By conferring being onto the etiologic
agent of disease, these theories inevitably cast sickness as ontologically distinct from
health, even though, at the level of the total organism, there is no perceived rupture or
consciousness of sickness at all. The discourse arising from the CDC completely eschews
any reference to the subjective disease. Instead, the localizing, ontological configuration
dominates the discourse, creating sickness in total organisms that, according to
Canguilhem‘s conception, are not ill, since they have no firsthand subjective experience
of the disease. As this analysis demonstrates, when the CDC considers the event of
disease or the infectious agent, the manifestation of disease in the infected individual is
the visible sign constituting sickness and inaugurating a novel state of being, according to
the objective conceptualization by the CDC, even though the living being experiences
absolutely no change in state.

3.1.3 The Positivist Representation
This tidy depiction of the CDC discourses as unified in their deployment of a
localizing, ontological model of disease to make sense of AIDS and HIV in the late
twentieth century hides a fundamental theoretical paradox. While the above analysis of
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the CDC language accurately represents the CDC‘s interpretation of the event of
infection and the transmission via etiologic agent, these facets of the discourse only
present one side of the discussion. By contrast, the documents produced by the CDC
dealing with the classification and surveillance of the incidence of HIV infection and
AIDS offer a somewhat contradictory picture. Although the localizing, ontological
representation of disease seems most fitting for an infectious disease, within its
classificatory project, the CDC‘s discourse aligns itself with the positivist conception of
disease, as explicated by Canguilhem.
Under the positivist conception of disease as it emerged from the work of
Broussais, Comte, and Bernard in the nineteenth century, disease was understood as a
mere quantitative deviation from health. These men were motivated by a desire to
construct pathology as a well-ordered science. To this end, they attempted to forge a link
between pathology and physiology by asserting the reducibility of pathology to
physiology. In other words, the theories of these influential pathologists maintain that
pathological phenomena are simply changes in intensity of the normal physiology. Health
and disease are no longer ontologically distinct states, but are instead conceived as points
along the same continuum. Unable to negate the subjective experience of disease, these
theories invoke the appearance/reality distinction. Thus, what appears to consciousness
and is experienced by the sick individual as a qualitatively distinct mode of being refers
back to the same underlying reality, the reality of physiology. Although these thinkers
have difficulty maintaining the language of homogeneity and continuity, they
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nevertheless forward the key positivist tenet that physiology and pathology are
―essentially one and the same thing.‖27
The positivist and ontological theories thus offer radically different manifestations
of disease to the medical and scientific gaze. The ontological configuration of disease, on
the one hand, populates the field before the gaze with diseases that are both qualitatively
distinct from health and manifest themselves as innovative, positive phenomena. On the
other hand, application of the positivist theory produces diseases that are mere
quantitative deviations from health, with no essential differences. These diseases present
themselves to the gaze not through their positivity, but rather through their negativity.
That is, because of their reducibility to normal physiology, these diseases present, in
relation to the normal, as absence, lack, and pure negativity.
The introduction of HIV into the body would seem to preclude the use of the
positivist model, since the virus does not originate within the normal physiology.
Nevertheless, the medical and scientific discourse arising from the CDC‘s classification
system manages to conceptualize AIDS as a disease remarkably similar to the positivist
ideal. That is to say, these CDC documents, by focusing on the immune system itself,
depict AIDS as classifiable on a quantitative scale, without any reference to the
qualitative distinction between health and disease. Attempting to develop a wholly
objective description of the disease, they fail to recognize AIDS as a positive presentation
of a novel pathological phenomenon, but instead identify AIDS as a lack of health and an
absence of normal immune function. According to this conception, the presence of HIV
or AIDS is not conceived as radically distinct from health. Thus, the staging of HIV and
AIDS progression remains directly comparable to the normal physiology. By and large,
27
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the CDC is able to present HIV infection and AIDS on the quantitative, sliding scale of
health because it overlooks the event of infection and the virus itself to focus instead on
the manifestation of the disease. Through this shift in focus, the discourse arising from
the CDC documents can encompass two conflicting theories of disease. AIDS, through
this discursive shift, can thus appear as an ontological disease at one moment and as a
positivist manifestation the next.
The language of the CDC documents offers a predominantly negative
characterization of AIDS. Out of this discourse, AIDS arises as a disease that, despite the
plethora of positive symptoms, is fundamentally a disease of absence and lack. AIDS
appears before the medical gaze as a ―defect in cell-mediated immunity,‖28 ―immune
dysfunction,‖29 ―progressive impairment of the immune response,‖30 a ―cellular
immunodeficiency,‖31 and ―immune suppression.‖32 Individuals with AIDS are
recognizable by their ―defective immune systems,‖33 by the numerical ―rates of decline”
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in their immune cells, 34 and by their generalized ―loss‖ of immune function. 35 Piecing
together the fragmented and multifarious descriptions from these documents, a picture of
AIDS emerges that represents the disease as, essentially, a negation of health and
normality. The discourse situates AIDS along the sliding scale of health, moving further
away from the physiological norm. It is a loss of health, a defect in normal functioning.
This disease appears before the medical and scientific gaze chiefly in the opening so
recently vacated by health itself. Paradoxically, it is only in the absence of health or
proper immune function that AIDS can appear before the gaze, since the disease seems to
have no positive reality of its own with which to assert itself as a proper object of
knowledge.
This negative characterization of the disease in adults recurs in the discussion of
infected children. In children, AIDS manifests itself in the laboratory in ―abnormal
immunologic test results,‖ but it also presents itself to the clinician. 36 However, even
though the 1987 classification system claims that adolescent and childhood AIDS has ―a
broad spectrum of clinical manifestation,‖ it fails to note that all these manifestations are
the absence of health or normality recoded as a positive manifestation of disease. 37 For
instance, included among the symptoms of childhood AIDS are ―loss of developmental
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milestones,‖ ―impaired brain growth,‖ ―motor deficits‖ and ―gait disturbances‖ along
with nonspecific ―immunologic abnormalities.‖38 None of these constitutes a positive
symptom or a manifestation of disease in its own right. Instead, these appear before the
medical gaze as symptoms only because they occur in front of the backdrop of the
concepts of normal and healthy childhood development.
From this concurrent discourse within the CDC publications on AIDS, opposing
portraits of the disease appear. Whereas Canguilhem‘s conception of a totalizing,
ontological representation of disease requires a clear distinction between the normal and
the pathological in the subjective experience of the sick being, this positivist model does
not recognize the diseased state as a fundamentally new way of life. Instead, it situates
both the diseased state and the normal state on the same quantitative continuum.
Established through the scientific technologies of quantification, this second image
partially occludes the novelty of the pathological state that appears when AIDS is
configured as a localizing, ontological disease. Identical laboratory and diagnostic
measurements of cell-mediated immunologic response can track the degree of immune
function in the HIV-infected individual and the healthy individual. By focusing on the
immune function, which is a part of normal physiology, the CDC has developed a
positivist classification system in which the loss of immune function caused by the virus
is wholly quantifiable and thereby comparable to the normal physiology. In this way, the
contemporary discourse structures the progression of AIDS as a steady slippage along the
continuum connecting health and disease in the positivist model of disease.
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From this analysis of the CDC discourse on AIDS and HIV, the dominance of
these two configurations of disease emerges. The localizing, ontological representation
and the positivist conception have monopolized the CDC discourse since the beginning of
the 1980s. Each functions differently within the overall characterization of AIDS and
HIV. For instance, the discourse makes use of the localizing, ontological model when it
attempts to explain transmission and infection, but it turns to the positivist account when
it desires to track the progression of the disease within the individual. However, both
exhibit one critical similarity that cannot be overlooked. Their dual deployment to
explain and configure AIDS and HIV supports and reinforces each other to effectively
exclude any conception of an ontological, totalizing disease. In other words, these two
configurations—the positivist and localizing, ontological—ensure that of the many
manifestations of HIV and AIDS, none will appear as a disease before the subjective
consciousness of the sick being.

3.2 AIDS as Condition
This section explores the connections between Foucault‘s discussion of the
historical concept of the condition as presented in Chapter 2 Section II and the
development of the contemporary phenomenon of AIDS within the medical and scientific
discourses of the CDC. Through the theoretical lens provided by Foucault‘s History of
Madness, it attempts to distinguish which parts of the contemporary AIDS discourse arise
simply from the deployment of the concept of the condition and which from the unique
contribution of AIDS itself. Although the disease, by its very name, constitutes a
syndrome, there is little explicit reference within the CDC discourse as to what exactly
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this entails. The striking parallels between Foucault‘s account of two conditions—
madness and homosexuality—and the contemporary discourse on AIDS suggest that his
elucidation of the historical concept of the condition may have practical value in the
interpretation of AIDS. Within his analysis, Foucault clarifies the complex relation
between the recognition and knowledge of the condition and also brings to light the
unique role of causality between the condition and its symptoms and other conditions or
diseases. Both of these topics prove to be fruitfully applied to the contemporary
phenomenon of AIDS, filling in the theoretical picture of disease only outlined within the
CDC documents.

3.2.1 Recognition and Knowledge
Within the structure of the condition, the fundamental gap that exists between its
presence and its manifestation creates a unique relationship between the recognition and
the knowledge of the condition. Because of this gap, the mere absence of a visible
manifestation, such as a definitive sign or symptom, does not rule out the possibility of
the condition‘s presence. Describing the condition of madness, Foucault claims this is an
―essential gap,‖ built into the concept (HM, 179). Nevertheless, this noncoincidence
between the presence and manifestation of the condition does not cause madness to
disappear into the realm of the inaccessible. Instead, he claims that in the eighteenth
century every sane individual could recognize the condition of madness in others through
a direct perceptual awareness, or ―enunciatory consciousness‖ (HM, 166). This direct
perception of madness is made possible by the figure of the madman. In the eighteenth
century, the madman is consubstantial with his madness. Only in him, in the figure of the
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madman, does madness reveal itself to the perceptual consciousness. The condition of
madness, which in itself is invisible to the gaze and imperceptible to consciousness,
becomes accessible to consciousness in the being of the madman. The presence of the
condition thus constitutes a being, and it is this being that is immediately recognizable.
Through this creation of a new type of being, the eighteenth century bridges the
fundamental gap between the presence and manifestation of the condition. Although the
presence of the condition might not disclose itself in a definitive sign, its manifestation is
unmistakable in the being of the madman.
Whereas the eighteenth century overcame the fundamental gap between the
presence and manifestation of the condition through recourse to the figure of the
madman, the recognition and identification of AIDS in the twentieth century still seems
hindered by this gap. Nothing nearly so certain as an enunciatory consciousness operates
within the discourse on AIDS which could bridge this gap entirely. An explicit awareness
of the noncoincidence between the presence and manifestation of AIDS exists within the
CDC discourse. Because the visible manifestation does not map directly onto the
condition, the CDC claims ―individuals at risk for transmitting AIDS may be difficult to
identify.‖39 In this case, the discourse on AIDS configures this fundamental gap as
temporal in nature. A time lag between the presence and visible manifestation of the
condition creates a moment of uncertainty when the presence of the condition cannot be
readily recognized and identified. The ―latent period‖ between exposure and

CDC, ―Current Trends Prevention of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS):
Report of Inter-Agency Recommendations,‖ MMWR 32, no. 8 (1983), 101-3.
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―recognizable clinical illness‖ suggests that before its visible manifestation, AIDS hides
within health. 40
Like the relation between reason and unreason in the eighteenth century, AIDS
also masquerades as its opposite—health. According to Foucault, madness in the
eighteenth century ―hides [its] enigmatic truth‖ (HM, 164), ―disguises most of its powers
and truths‖ (HM, 167), and has ―an essential aptitude for mimicking reason‖ (HM, 177).
All these traits arise from the gap between the invisible condition and its visible
manifestation. However, the eighteenth-century enunciatory consciousness of madness
overcomes this difficulty of recognition, since it does not require a visible presence.
Without recourse to a direct and immediate perception of the condition, the discourse on
AIDS cannot resolve this problem. AIDS and health intertwine and offer no opening for
the medical gaze to pry them apart. Not wanting to let AIDS recede into the inaccessible
depths of health in this way, the CDC, paradoxically, attempts to classify health as a
symptom of AIDS. The following are two excerpts from CDC publications, one from
before the discovery of HIV and one after:
This case definition [of AIDS] may not include the full spectrum of AIDS
manifestations, which may range from absence of symptoms…to non-specific
symptoms…to specific diseases that are insufficiently predictive of cellular
immunodeficiency…to malignant neoplasms. 41
Persons infected with the etiologic retrovirus of acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS) may present with a variety of manifestations ranging from
asymptomatic infection to severe immunodeficiency and life-threatening
secondary disease or cancers. 42

40

Ibid.

CDC, ―Current Trends Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)—
United States,‖ MMWR 31, no. 37 (1982), 507-8, 513-14; emphasis added.
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These excerpts from the MMWR both acknowledge the difficulty of identifying AIDS,
since the presence of AIDS does not necessarily coincide with its visible manifestation.
One of the manifestations of AIDS and HIV, according to both these documents, is the
absence of symptoms. But what is this absence of symptoms? By claiming AIDS can
present by not presenting any symptoms, these documents imply AIDS, in respect to at
least one of its manifestations, is indistinguishable from health. In other words, one of the
symptoms of the condition is an absence of symptoms. Although the document most
likely simply means to assert that sometimes the condition of AIDS has no visible
manifestation and has no recognizable presentation, this paradoxical formulation
underlines the difficulty posed by the essential gap that accompanies any condition. The
application of Foucault‘s discussion of the condition of madness to the discourse on
AIDS brings this fundamental gap to the fore. The CDC glosses over the fact that AIDS
and HIV sometimes have no visible manifestation, since it recasts an absence of
symptoms as a positive symptom. For the CDC, it is neither an absence nor a lack but a
presentation and a manifestation of the condition. Foucault‘s work with the historical
formation of the concept of the condition sheds light on this peculiar aspect of the
discourse on AIDS and HIV. The conundrum the CDC grapples with in this case is not
unique to the contemporary phenomenon of AIDS, but rather it emerges from the
fundamental structure of the concept of the condition.
In Foucault‘s account, the immediate consciousness of madness in the figure of
the madman reveals an interesting disconnect between recognition and knowledge.

CDC, ―Current Trends Classification System for Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type
III/ Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus Infections,‖ MMWR 35, no. 20 (1986), 334-39; emphasis
added.
42
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Whereas recognition of disease historically requires a knowledge of that disease, either in
the form of an ideal key (as in the eighteenth century) or a statistical representation (as in
the nineteenth), the recognition of the condition, in contrast, does not. Since recognition
of the condition occurs at the level of sense perception, it avoids passing through the
domain of knowledge altogether. Hence, the mere recognition of the condition does not
imply any theoretical knowledge of it. Any theoretical knowledge of the condition comes
a posteriori based upon this prior recognition. About the possibility of theoretical
knowledge of the condition of madness, Foucault writes: ―There can be no knowledge of
madness, however much it claims to rest exclusively on scientific knowledge, that does
not, despite everything, suppose the prior movement of a critical debate, where reason
confronted madness‖ (HM, 167). In other words, the confrontation between the sane
individual and the madman in which madness presents itself immediately to
consciousness provides the foundation for the development of any knowledge of this
condition. Even though the eighteenth century later built a theoretical discourse around
the condition of madness, this knowledge arose from the primal recognition of madness
in the being of the madman by the enunciatory consciousness.
Although the relationship between the recognition and the knowledge of AIDS in
the late twentieth century operates somewhat differently than the relationship Foucault
depicts between these two concepts for the condition of madness in the eighteen century,
there is, nevertheless, sufficient overlap for a fruitful comparison. The primary
divergence between the account Foucault gives of the condition of madness and the
account gleaned from the CDC discourse on AIDS centers upon the act of recognition.
For the eighteenth century, no ideal key, no knowledge, and no previous experience of
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madness were required for one to recognize madness in the madman. The act of
recognition was instantaneous and completely divorced from all knowledge. In the case
of AIDS, the distance between recognition and knowledge is not quite so great.
Nevertheless, something similar to the enunciatory consciousness Foucault describes in
the eighteenth century seems to be operating in the recognition of AIDS.
The June 5, 1981 MMWR offers insights into the mode of perception of AIDS.
Presenting the first documented cases of an unknown immune dysfunction, this report,
obviously, does not mention AIDS by name. In fact, the report, which details five cases
of PCP in previously healthy homosexual men, does not have any experiential or
theoretical knowledge of AIDS or some generalized underlying condition. At most, the
authors can offer speculation about the unusual occurrence of PCP in otherwise healthy
individuals. In an editorial note, they indicate that these findings may ―suggest the
possibility of a cellular-immune dysfunction.‖43 The cautionary language of this
suggestion indicates the CDC has no knowledge of AIDS. At this moment in time, there
exists no theoretical knowledge of AIDS, since it is an entirely unknown phenomenon.
Moreover, before this report in the MMWR, there was also no experiential knowledge of
AIDS. Yet, despite this lack of knowledge, the physicians in southern California
perceived the trace, a mere glimpse, of an underlying condition. If nothing else, the
physicians recognized a perceptible sameness in these five disparate cases. 44 Of course,
this recognition is not as utterly isolated from knowledge as the recognition of the
CDC, ―Pneumocystis Pneumonia—Los Angeles,‖ MMWR 30, no. 21 (1981), 1-3;
emphasis added.
43
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Indeed, these five cases were truly disparate with PCP and homosexuality providing
the only links. The men‘s ages, occupations, and other illnesses and symptoms differ in every
respect.
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madman in the eighteenth century. One might argue, quite plausibly, that the physicians‘
knowledge of PCP undergirds the recognition of sameness of some underlying condition.
Even so, there seems to be a hint of some more primal consciousness that bears a
resemblance to the enunciatory consciousness of the condition of madness. Because of
the diversity of other symptoms and illnesses also present in these men, PCP cannot
function as a definitive sign of the condition in 1981. Like madness, this new condition of
immune dysfunction seems to appear to consciousness as a distinct thing without first
passing through a ―tell-tale sign‖ or the domain of knowledge (HM, 178). Only after this
prior recognition of clusters of cases of this unknown condition can the medical and
scientific discourse begin to found a knowledge of AIDS. In this case, the primary
recognition of the condition of AIDS, while it approaches knowledge, ultimately does not
seem to pass through the domain of knowledge on its route to recognition. 45

3.2.2 Causality
As it developed within psychiatry in the late nineteenth century, the concept of the
condition established a unique relation to causality. Unlike a disease, the condition does
not follow the linear progression of pathological processes, and it does not act in a oneto-one chain of cause and effect. Rather, according to Foucault, the condition operates as
45

The CDC admits that the historical recognition of AIDS preceded knowledge of the
virus, the cause of the condition: ―AIDS was defined for national reporting before its etiology was
known and has encompassed only certain secondary conditions that reliably reflect the presence
of a severe immune dysfunction.‖ (CDC, ―Current Trends Revision of the Case Definition of
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome for National Reporting—United States,‖ MMWR 34, no.
25 (1985).) This claim on the part of the CDC aligns even more closely with the account of
madness given by Foucault if we recall that the virus, HIV, and not the syndrome, AIDS, has
ontological priority as it is conceptualized by the medical and scientific discourse. Knowledge
resides at the level of the virus and not at the level of the visible manifestations of the syndrome.
In this way, the perception of the syndrome (i.e., the visible, clinical manifestations) historically
precedes all knowledge of it (i.e., the underlying cause, HIV).
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the stable backdrop from which any number of other conditions or diseases can emerge.
It is the uncultivated yet fecund soil of the garden of perversions. Although it is not the
sole cause, the condition provides the nourishment and support for the illness to take root.
In this way, the causal nexus of the condition defies the strict causality of disease
processes. It has ―total etiological value‖ and must be deployed in any explanation, yet it
exhibits an ―indefinite causal permissiveness‖ (A, 312, 314). The chief characteristic of
the condition is that it enables the positing of practically any causal linkages—―anything
can be the cause of anything else‖ (A, 314). For nineteenth-century psychiatry, the
expansiveness and permissiveness of the concept of the condition enables it to establish
its position of authority over the abnormal. The concept of the condition, which functions
similarly in modern medicine, by contrast only serves to befuddle medicine, which
prefers the strict causality of the disease to this nebulous web of infinitely many causal
relations of the condition.
The constantly evolving case definitions of AIDS as formulated by the CDC
exhibit an attempt to reign in the causal permissiveness of the condition. That is, the
scientific and medical discourse of the CDC attempts to achieve the strict causality of
pathological processes despite the characterization of AIDS as a condition. In 1982, the
CDC produced the first case definition of AIDS. According to that definition, AIDS was
classified as the appearance of KS, PCP, or other serious opportunistic infections ―in a
person with no known cause for diminished resistance to that disease.‖46 With this
definition, the CDC aimed to capture all the known visible manifestations that were ―at

CDC, ―Current Trends Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)—
United States,‖ MMWR 31, no. 37 (1982), 507-8, 513-14.
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least moderately predictive of a defect in cell-mediated immunity.‖47 Although it does not
reach the level of causality, this attempt at prediction seems to signify a resistance to the
causal permissiveness of the condition. In other words, the CDC does not want to remain
at the level of the condition, since, according to Foucault, ―a condition can produce
absolutely anything, at any time, and in any order‖ (A, 312). Instead, the medical and
scientific discourse of the CDC wants to situate AIDS within a well-ordered and welldefined pathological process, but the ―nonspecific‖ presentation of AIDS thwarts this
attempt.48 As the CDC updates the case definition of AIDS by enumerating more and
more visible manifestations (e.g., disseminated histoplasmosis, isoporiasis with chronic
diarrhea, candidiasis, and non-Hodgkin‘s lymphoma, added to the 1985 case definition), 49
the condition continues to evade any strict causality. Despite the efforts of the CDC, the
causal permissiveness of the condition within the natural history of AIDS has not given
way to a fixed course and necessary causal connections, since the notion of the condition,
which the CDC deploys to explain AIDS, resists this type of causality.
While the characterization of AIDS as a condition at the etiologic level proves
troublesome, the CDC discourse exploits the function of the condition at the level of risk.
By invoking the language of risk, the CDC discourse mimics nineteenth-century
psychiatry‘s relation to the abnormal and dangerous individual. With the notion of
danger, nineteenth-century psychiatry establishes its position as an institution of public
hygiene and safety. It claims to perceive danger where others cannot; the ―detection of
47
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CDC, ―Current Trends Classification System for Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV) Infection in Children Under 13 Years of Age,‖ MMWR 36, no. 15 (1987), 225-30, 235-36.
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CDC, ―Current Trends Revision of the Case Definition of Acquired Immunodeficiency
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possible danger‖ is the exclusive domain of psychiatry (A, 120). In addition, it creates the
being of the dangerous individual prior to the constitutive act. That is, before she breaks
any law or commits any crime, the dangerous individual appears before the gaze of the
psychiatrist. The twentieth-century deployment of the term ‗risk groups‘ in regard to
potential AIDS cases functions in much the same manner. By classifying individuals by
certain behaviors or characteristics and then reifying them into a certain type—the
dangerous, potentially infectious individual—the CDC implicitly invokes the concept of
the condition. According to Foucault, the condition acts as ―a sort of permanent causal
backdrop on the basis of which illness may develop‖ (A, 312). The concept of the risk
group has precisely the same function. According to the CDC classification system,
―reported AIDS cases may be separated into groups based on these risk factors‖:
homosexual or bisexual males, intravenous drug users, Haitians, and persons with
hemophilia A.50 By labeling these four groups as at risk, the CDC presents them as
afflicted with a condition, not the condition of AIDS, but rather the condition which
entails the possibility of AIDS. That is to say, neither homosexuality nor hemophilia is
the cause of AIDS, but it provides that ―permanent causal backdrop‖ from which AIDS
can emerge. Conferring the status of being on individuals within these groups, the CDC,
like psychiatry before it, aims to perceive dangerous individuals prior to the visible
manifestation of the condition of AIDS. Thus, at the level of populations and risk, the
discourse on AIDS reproduces the discourses that originally emerged around the
condition of the abnormal individual within psychiatry a century before.

CDC, ―Current Trends Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)—
United States,‖ MMWR 31, no. 37 (1982), 507-8, 513-14.
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INCONCLUSION
Thinking about illness!—To calm the imagination of the invalid, so that at least he
should not, as hitherto, have to suffer more from thinking about his illness than
from the illness itself—that, I think, would be something! It would be a great
deal!
—Nietzsche, Daybreak
Like other cultural events that are mysterious, life threatening, and indefinitely
extended over space and time, the AIDS epidemic compels us to try to make
sense of it—hence its enormous power to generate meanings. Yet we need to push
past this commonsense conclusion and ask more precise questions about the
conditions under which meanings proliferate. What are the key cultural and
structural characteristics that promote the generation of meanings? What are the
processes and mechanisms through which individual meanings originate? Whose
discourses speak through particular understandings of the AIDS epidemic? Whose
are obscured? And what are we to make of them?
—Paula Treichler, How to Have Theory in
an Epidemic: Cultural Chronicles of AIDS

A theoretical work on health and disease and the configuration of AIDS and HIV
can never be complete. At best it can offer a few points of intervention and sites of
resistance against hegemonic discourses and encourage the reconsideration of the use and
deployment of these purportedly objective medical and scientific concepts. By focusing
on the historical emergence and formation of concepts relating to health and disease, this
work hopes to have done just that. Through the careful review and analysis of the medical
and scientific projects of Michel Foucault and Georges Canguilhem and a preliminary
investigation of both points of overlap and of divergence between these historical
concepts and the contemporary portrait of AIDS and HIV, I am optimistic that my reader
now has new tools with which to reenvision the relationship between AIDS and health.
Establishing a firm theoretical foundation rooted in historical analysis, this work serves
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merely as a point of departure from which to interrogate the systems of knowledge that
undergird the contemporary medical and scientific configuration of AIDS and HIV.
Within the theoretical conceptualization of this work, many avenues for future
study remain open. For instance, Canguilhem‘s text with its denunciation of a positivist
conception of disease might offer us a new way of thinking about AIDS and HIV.
Derailing the positivist dream of a completely objective knowledge of disease,
Canguilhem‘s analysis forces us to consider what medical practices and discourses might
look like if we reinserted the subjective perspective of the sick being. How would the
practice of medicine change if it acknowledged the critical role of the patient in
distinguishing the normal from the pathological and health from sickness? How could the
reconfiguration of AIDS as an ontological pathological phenomenon, a state qualitatively
different from health, affect the sick being? Obviously, for one, asymptomatic HIV
infection would no longer constitute a disease for the sick being, since by definition it has
no positive presence in consciousness. Canguilhem‘s work leaves us with this ethical
project. The question of how to meld together the subjective and objective points of view,
while retaining therapeutic efficacy, is one challenge opened up by Canguilhem‘s
analysis that remains for future studies to consider. Likewise, the work of Foucault
reminds us that the modern configuration of disease, with its spatialization in the body
and its temporal progression, is not a transhistorical truth of disease. New projects of
redescription and perspectival analyses arising with new systems of knowledge will lead
to different and perhaps better (or worse) configurations. This prevalence of ideas and
fragments, leads and possible paths for future inquiry arising from this work, confirm
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openness of the perceptual and theoretical horizon for those who find the same urgency
as I for rethinking and redescribing disease.
Although my project focuses on medical and scientific discourses from the
eighteenth to the twentieth century and ultimately turns to the specific discourse that
emerged from the CDC in the late twentieth century, it does not intend to imply that the
medical and scientific discourse produced and promulgated by this US governmental
agency holds exclusive rights to the domain of meanings surrounding AIDS and HIV, nor
that it should. That is, the selective focus of this work does not mean to efface the
subjective and phenomenological experiences of people with HIV and AIDS. Indeed, if
anything, this work demands further theoretical labor to understand the changing
perceptions of the disease in those most affected by it. How do the dominant medical and
scientific discourses alter the ways in which those infected confer meaning upon their
own disease? How does the modern medical configuration of HIV and AIDS translate
into subjective experience? In addition, this project illuminates the need to continue
Foucault‘s work of exposing the relation between systems of knowledge and the
deployment of power. If nothing else, the emergence of AIDS late last century revealed
the urgent need to carry on Foucault‘s project of querying this relationship between
knowledge and power into the domain of our modern conceptions of health and disease.
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